Open carry is a right. There are five places you cannot open carry.
A police station that has a holding cell/jail.
A place that serves liquor/beer.
A state run mental hospital.
I don't see your house or your yard in the list.
You can open carry in your car with a CC license.
You can actually open carry in state run government buildings, not federal buildings.
Some will tell you that federal law - 18 USC 922(q) disallows open carry in school zones. And the statute does say that.
But, since Congress amended 18 USC 922(q) there has been two courts that I know of that has upheld Congresses changes See United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999). Both are contrary to Lopez.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995) and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) all made it clear that under the Commerce Clause Congress is required to show a tangible link to commerce, not a mere conceivable rational relation. “[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.” See Lopez, supra, at 557, n. 2 (quoting Hodel, supra, at 311 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
The Lopez Court made it clear that the Commerce Clause would not carry the day when it comes to carrying a gun in a school zone.
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.
I suggest you read Lopez yourself.To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action. See supra, at 556-558. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, at 195, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local, cf. Jones & Laughlin Steel, supra, at 30. This we are unwilling to do.