[SIZE=+1]"The principles governing a plea of self-defense are well-established. Self-defense is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder, and in making such a plea, a "defendant implicitly admits the killing was intentional and assumes the burden of introducing evidence of justification or excuse that raises a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors." McGhee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 560, 562, 248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1978). The "bare fear" of serious bodily injury, or even death, however well- grounded, will not justify the taking of human life. Stoneman v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 887, 900 (1874). "There must [also] be some overt act indicative of imminent danger at the time." Vlastaris v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 647, 652, 178 S.E. 775, 776 (1935). See also Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 975, 234 S.E.2d 286, 290 (1977); Mercer v. Commonwealth, 150 Va. 588, 597, 142 S.E. 369, 371 (1928). In other words, a defendant "must wait till some overt act is done[,] . . . till the danger becomes imminent." Vlastaris, 164 Va. at 652, 178 S.E. at 777. In the context of a self-defense plea, "imminent danger" is defined as "[a]n immediate, real threat to one's safety . . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 399 (7th ed. 1999). "There must be . . . some act menacing present peril . . . [and] [t]he act . . . must be of such a character as to afford a reasonable ground for believing there is a design . . . to do some serious bodily harm, and imminent danger of carrying such design into immediate execution." Byrd v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 536, 539, 16 S.E. 727, 729 (1893).[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]In holding that the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on self-defense, the Court of Appeals construed the term "imminent" to mean something less than "immediate." Sands, 33 Va. App. at 678, 536 S.E.2d at 465 (quoting Sam v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 312, 325, 411 S.E.2d 832, 839 (1991)). Applying its view of that term, the Court of Appeals concluded that, "nder the facts of this case, the fact finder could reasonably have concluded that [the defendant] was without fault in beginning the altercation, reasonably apprehended she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm and, thus, was justified in shooting her husband to prevent him from killing her or further inflicting serious bodily harm upon her." Sands, 33 Va. App. at 679, 536 S.E.2d at 465.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]We agree that the defendant reasonably believed that she was in danger of serious bodily harm or death. Nevertheless, that reasonable belief is not dispositive of the issue before us in this appeal. The question here is whether the circumstances immediately surrounding the killing, specifically, the actions of the defendant's husband at that time, were sufficient to create a reasonable belief of an imminent danger which had to be met. The Court of Appeals did not squarely address this requirement of an overt act.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, the evidence fails to reveal any overt act by her husband that presented an imminent danger at the time of the shooting. The last episode between the defendant and her husband occurred after the defendant telephoned Shelton. Then, sufficient time elapsed for Shelton to arrive at the couple's home, and for the defendant to view the extent of her injuries while in the bathroom with Shelton, walk from the bathroom to the living room door, turn around and proceed back into the kitchen, retrieve a gun from a cabinet, and walk back into the bedroom where her husband was reclining on the bed, watching television. At that moment, the only reaction by the defendant's husband was his question, "What are you doing[?]" While we do not doubt the defendant's genuine fear for her life or minimize the atrocities inflicted upon her, we cannot point to any evidence of an overt act indicating imminent danger, or indeed any act at all by her husband, when she shot him five times while he reclined on the bed. Nor did the Court of Appeals cite to any such evidence. Thus, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on self-defense. The requirement of an overt act indicative of imminent danger ensures that the most extreme recourse, the killing of another human being, will be used only in situations of necessity. "The plea of self-defense is a plea of necessity and the necessity must be shown to exist or there must be shown such reasonable apprehension of the immediate danger, by some overt act, as to amount to the creation of necessity." Vlastaris, 164 Va. at 651, 178 S.E. at 776.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]CONCLUSION[/SIZE] [SIZE=+1]For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter final judgment reinstating the convictions. Reversed and final judgment."[/SIZE]
