The legislature's failure to define the term "common pocketknife" in section 790.001(13) does not render that term unconstitutionally vague. (where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense). Moreover, a court may refer to a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning which the legislature intended to ascribe to the term.
To that end, we note that Webster's defines "common" as: "known to the community; occurring or appearing frequently esp. in the ordinary course of events; of, relating to, or typical of the many rather than the few." Webster's defines "pocketknife" as "a knife with a blade folding into the handle to fit it for being carried in the pocket." From these definitions, we can infer that the legislature's intended definition of "common pocketknife" was: "A type of knife occurring frequently in the community which has a blade that folds into the handle and that can be carried in one's pocket." We believe that in the vast majority of cases, it will be evident to citizens and fact-finders whether one's pocketknife is a "common" pocketknife under any intended definition of that term.
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As to the knife at issue here, we hold that petitioner's knife plainly falls within the statutory exception to the definition of "weapon" found in section 790.001(13). In 1951
, the Attorney General of Florida opined that a pocketknife with a blade of four inches in length or less was a "common pocketknife." Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 051-358 (1951). The knife appellant carried, which had a 3 3/4-inch blade, clearly fell within this range. Accordingly, appellant's conviction is vacated as we find that the knife in question was a "common pocketknife" under any intended definition of that term.
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