The state did not appeal.
Please tell us about how the state can appeal a judgment of acquittal.
What's there to tell. Only a neophyte attorney would ask such a first year law school question. And what would prompt such a question is puzzling. Unless, like most assistant prosecuting attorneys, they are trying to demonstrate their ignorance of the law.
I'm trying to figure out who made such a statement. It appears no one did. Yet, Werz quoted my clear and concise statement: “The state did not appeal.” My statement did NOT mention a word about the state appealing an acquittal verdict. So, the only conclusion I can surmise is an arrogant attorney is trying to pick a fight.
So, why did I say the state did not appeal? Well, we know the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a directed verdict is a final verdict for purposes of R.C. 2945.67. See
State v. Keeton, 18 Ohio St.3d 379 (1985), see paragraph two of the syllabus.
And we know that in a bench trial, jeopardy attaches when the judge begins to receive evidence. See
State v. Meade, 80 Ohio St.3d 419, 424 (1997), citing
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978), and
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977). “[T]he principles of double jeopardy preclude retrial of [a defendant].”
State v. Davis, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 03 CA-A-07038, 2004-Ohio- 2804, ¶ 8.
Even so, an appeal is not moot if “the underlying legal question is capable of repetition yet evading review.” Id. at ¶ 9, quoting
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 (1974), fn.8. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[a] court of appeals has discretionary authority pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A) to review substantive law rulings made in a criminal case which result in a judgment of acquittal so long as the judgment itself is not appealed.” See
State v. Bistricky, 51 Ohio St.3d 157 (1990), syllabus.
Why didn't the state appeal? I can only think of three reasons. One, they didn't care. Two, they didn't know they could. And three, they knew they would loose because they knew that “or” means “or.”
And would it make sense for a criminal suspect to be required to give his date of birth but not his name? Really?
Why yes it would. R.C. 2921.29 was part of the Ohio Patriot Act. The construction of the statute was based on
Hiibel. They clearly knew that Hiibel authorized name only as it relates to a
Terry stop. To not cross the line set by the Supreme Court in
Hiibel the Senate new that using the term “or” in the statute would not allow R.C. 2921.29 to go afoul of the high court's ruling.
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/...mittee&hf=analyses126/s0009-rrh-126.htm#_ftn1
You should also realize that Hiibel limited its analysis to the Nevada statute which required only a name.
And
Terry v. Ohio only applies to Ohio.
I supplied an actual case directly dealing with R.C. 2921.29 where the defendant was acquitted by only giving their name.
Werz offered an anecdotal legal opinion which lacked any case law directly addressing the issue.
Have a nice day......