WalkingWolf
Regular Member
I want that officer to articulate in detail what the movement was, down to every last finger. This should be expected anytime a life is taken.
I want that officer to articulate in detail what the movement was, down to every last finger. This should be expected anytime a life is taken.
I want the winning numbers for tomorrow night's Lotto before 10 PM tonight.
It'll be a race to see who gets what they want first.
stay safe.
As an aside, "off duty" cops are still "on duty" when they choose to enforce the law, which gives them the privilege/dispensation to display their firearm under circumstances denied to the proles. Reports say that the cop identified himself as such.
The deceased made a sudden movement which would make it justified.
I want that officer to articulate in detail what the movement was, down to every last finger. This should be expected anytime a life is taken.
Winning numbers for 10/20/15 Mega Millions drawing can be found here.I want the winning numbers for tomorrow night's Lotto before 10 PM tonight.
So what are the rules for a police officer pointing a gun at a suspect who is engaged in a non-violent theft and who passively refuses to obey orders?
Charles
Brown was in the process of committing a felony. Not that that warrants getting shot. But, the story is not about the car but about brown and this alleged furtive movement.
So I guess my question remains. Under Virginia law, would a non-cop LAC have remained an LAC for confronting Brown in a similar manner, gun drawn such that it was possible to shoot him over the claimed furtive movement?
Charles
what do you think ???
You ask many interrelated questions - not the least of which is the physical confrontation that developed.. The brandishing law is certainly vexing as it potentially limits being prepared.I could wager a guess and probably be right. But I thought I'd ask the locals before surmising that an LAC would likely be out of compliance with law had he acted as the off-duty officer elected to in this case....and that even if the trigger never got squeezed.
Please surprise me and tell me I'm wrong about Virginia State law.
Charles
You ask many interrelated questions - not the least of which is the physical confrontation that developed.. The brandishing law is certainly vexing as it potentially limits being prepared.
BTW - the perp would seem to have been engaged in a felony.
If I am in my bank, I am not permitted to shoot the bank robber stealing my money, unless he points his gun at me.
If I am in my bank, I am not permitted to shoot the bank robber stealing my money, unless he points his gun at me.
In Va one is not "pemitted" to use deadly force.
No single rule/law will apply here.
(internal citations omitted)The "bare fear" of serious bodily injury, or even death, however well- grounded, will not justify the taking of human life. "There must [also] be some overt act indicative of imminent danger at the time."
" Bernard Payne was charged with violating the felony provision of Code § 46.2-817. The trial court held that the term "serious bodily injury" was unconstitutionally vague and dismissed the felony charge. The Commonwealth appeals...
Furthermore, in determining the meaning of a statute, "[t]he validity of using other Code sections as interpretive guides is well established. The Code of Virginia constitutes a single body of law, and other sections can be looked to where the same phraseology is employed." King v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 708, 710, 347 S.E.2d 530, 531 (1986). Code § 18.2-369, which concerns abuse or neglect of incapacitated adults, reads: "For purposes of this subsection, 'serious bodily injury or disease' shall include but not be limited to (i) disfigurement, (ii) a fracture, (iii) a severe burn or laceration, (iv) mutilation, (v) maiming, or (vi) life threatening internal injuries or conditions, whether or not caused by trauma." The term "serious bodily injury" can also be found in other statutes. See Code § 10.1-1455 (handling of hazardous wastes), 16.1-228 (family abuse definition), 16.1-269.1 (transfer of juveniles to circuit court), 17-237 (sentencing guidelines), 18.2-67.3 (aggravated sexual battery), 29.1-740 (duty to stop and render assistance); 54.1-2400.1 (duty of mental health service providers to prevent violence), and 54.1-3434.3 (denial, revocation, and suspension of pharmacy registration).
With such widespread use of the term, it is plain that the term does have a common and well-recognized meaning. As such, ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and the inclusion of the term in the statute does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Therefore, the term is not unconstitutionally vague."
"In this appeal, we decide whether a deadly weapon may be brandished in defense of personal property.
....
The law is clearly stated by a learned judge in State v. Morgan, 3 Ired. 186, 38 Am. Dec. 714, as follows: "When it is said that a man may rightfully use as much force as is necessary for the protection of his person and property, it should be recollected that this rule is subject to this most important modification, that he shall not, except in extreme cases, endanger human life or do great bodily harm. It is not every right of person, and still less of property, that can lawfully be asserted, or every wrong that may rightfully be redressed by extreme remedies.
....
You can only kill to save life or limb, or prevent a great crime, or to accomplish a necessary public duty.
....
The threat to use deadly force by brandishing a deadly weapon has long been considered an assault."
"This Court has held, in connection with robbery, that "'the word "fear" . . . does not so much mean "fright" as it means "apprehension"; one too brave to be frightened may yet be apprehensive of bodily harm.'" Seaton, 42 Va. App. at 749, 595 S.E.2d at 14 (quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 20.3(d), at 187-88 (2d ed. 2003)) (emphasis in original).
In other words, "'[w]hen the pertinent test is cast in terms of a victim being put in "fear" of injury, it is not necessary that the victim be frightened; it is necessary merely that he be reasonably apprehensive of injury.'" Id. (quoting Charles E. Torcia, 4 Wharton's Criminal Law § 462, at 21 (15th ed. 1996)) (emphasis in original). The dispositive issue in this case, therefore, is whether there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Moon was reasonably apprehensive of bodily harm induced by Huffman brandishing the gun in her presence.
Says who, the bank?