Mike, remembering that the Slaughterhouse Cases were decided in 1873, we can then see that the Court in Cruikshank, simply built upon that precedent. If the court in '73 read the privileges and immunities clause out of the 14th, then the Court in '75 only followed precedent. In order to overturn Cruikshank, Slaughterhouse must first be reversed!
In Presser v. Illinois (1886), the situation is wholly different. Here the question was not so much as a 2A case, as it was a case for state regulation of its own militia. Perfectly lawful and constitutional, by the way. The state was not saying that the people could not own firearms, only that public assemblies (parades and drills) of the (unorganized) militia were forbidden unless ordered/sanctioned by the state. This decision was correct.
In order to understand why Cruikshank was wrong, we need to discuss what the slaughterhouse Court did and why that decision was wrong; How this led to the "selective incorporation theory" and why this legal theory is wrong. This is probably beyond the scope of this particular thread.
For instance, in Slaughterhouse, the Court took the view that national and state citizenship were two distinct things. Yet the 14th doesn't say that. The Court also said that the purpose of the 14th was only to protect the recently freed slaves. The 14th doesn't say that, either.
So what does the 14th say? "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." Nothing in the proceeding separates the two forms of citizenship. They run concurrent with each other.
The 14th further says that, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;" So that if any national privileges or immunities were restricted because of state citizenship, then national citizenship is injured and redress through the Courts or Congressional legislation could be sought. The
14th was very reaching in its enactment and changed the entire nature of the relationship between the national government and the state governments. But it was stymied, in large part, right out of the barn by this one Supreme Court Decision.
