Doug Huffman
Banned
imported post
http://www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/documents/07-0290bs.pdf
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/07-290_resp_merits.pdf
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Second Amendment plainly protects “the
right of the people”—an individual right—“to keep
and bear arms.”
However else Petitioners might regulate the
possession and use of arms, their complete ban on the
home possession of all functional firearms, and their
prohibition against home possession and movement of
handguns, are unconstitutional.
The Amendment’s structure and etymology are
not overly mysterious. The first clause, referencing
the importance of “[a] well regulated Militia,” provides
a non-exclusive yet perfectly sensible justification
for securing the people’s right to keep and bear
arms. In any event, the Second Amendment’s preamble
cannot limit, transform, or negate its operative
rights-securing text.
3
The Second Amendment was engendered by the
Framers’ bitter experience with the King’s disarmament
of the population. That disarmament was
especially pernicious to the colonists, who fervently
believed they possessed an individual right to arms.
In resisting British tyranny, the militia were not
directed by the government officials they sought to
overthrow, but certainly depended on the citizenry’s
familiarity with, and private possession of, firearms.
The Second Amendment’s text thus reflects two
related, non-exclusive concerns: it confirms the people’s
right to arms and explains that the right is
necessary for free people to guarantee their security
by acting as militia.
The Second Amendment’s drafting and ratification
history demonstrates it was designed to secure
individual rights, consistent with the demands of the
Anti-Federalists, whom the Bill of Rights was intended
to mollify. Petitioners’ militia theory was
specifically addressed—and rejected—by the Framers,
and that rejection is confirmed by centuries of
precedent. Precedent likewise confirms the individual
nature of Second Amendment rights.
Under this Court’s precedent, the arms whose
individual possession is protected by the Second
Amendment are those arms that (1) are of the kind in
common use, such that civilians would be expected to
have them for ordinary purposes, and (2) would have
military utility in time of need. A weapon that satisfies
only one of these requirements would not be
4
protected by the Second Amendment. Handguns
indisputably satisfy both requirements.
Petitioners concede that a functional firearms
ban would be inconsistent with an individual right to
arms. The dispute surrounding D.C. Code section 7-
2507.02 thus merely concerns statutory interpretation.
The D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of this section’s
language is correct.
Although this case does not call upon the Court
to determine the standard of review applicable to
regulations of Second Amendment rights, Respondent
observes that the right to arms protects two of the
most fundamental rights—the defense of one’s life
inside one’s home, and the defense of society against
tyrannical usurpation of authority. Petitioners’ casual
use of social science sharply underscores the importance
of securing Second Amendment rights with a
meaningful standard of review.
Finally, Petitioners’ contention that the Second
Amendment is not binding law within the Nation’s
capital is spurious.
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/march08.shtml collection of briefs, petitioner's(19) and respondent's(1).
http://www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/documents/07-0290bs.pdf
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/07-290_resp_merits.pdf
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Second Amendment plainly protects “the
right of the people”—an individual right—“to keep
and bear arms.”
However else Petitioners might regulate the
possession and use of arms, their complete ban on the
home possession of all functional firearms, and their
prohibition against home possession and movement of
handguns, are unconstitutional.
The Amendment’s structure and etymology are
not overly mysterious. The first clause, referencing
the importance of “[a] well regulated Militia,” provides
a non-exclusive yet perfectly sensible justification
for securing the people’s right to keep and bear
arms. In any event, the Second Amendment’s preamble
cannot limit, transform, or negate its operative
rights-securing text.
3
The Second Amendment was engendered by the
Framers’ bitter experience with the King’s disarmament
of the population. That disarmament was
especially pernicious to the colonists, who fervently
believed they possessed an individual right to arms.
In resisting British tyranny, the militia were not
directed by the government officials they sought to
overthrow, but certainly depended on the citizenry’s
familiarity with, and private possession of, firearms.
The Second Amendment’s text thus reflects two
related, non-exclusive concerns: it confirms the people’s
right to arms and explains that the right is
necessary for free people to guarantee their security
by acting as militia.
The Second Amendment’s drafting and ratification
history demonstrates it was designed to secure
individual rights, consistent with the demands of the
Anti-Federalists, whom the Bill of Rights was intended
to mollify. Petitioners’ militia theory was
specifically addressed—and rejected—by the Framers,
and that rejection is confirmed by centuries of
precedent. Precedent likewise confirms the individual
nature of Second Amendment rights.
Under this Court’s precedent, the arms whose
individual possession is protected by the Second
Amendment are those arms that (1) are of the kind in
common use, such that civilians would be expected to
have them for ordinary purposes, and (2) would have
military utility in time of need. A weapon that satisfies
only one of these requirements would not be
4
protected by the Second Amendment. Handguns
indisputably satisfy both requirements.
Petitioners concede that a functional firearms
ban would be inconsistent with an individual right to
arms. The dispute surrounding D.C. Code section 7-
2507.02 thus merely concerns statutory interpretation.
The D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of this section’s
language is correct.
Although this case does not call upon the Court
to determine the standard of review applicable to
regulations of Second Amendment rights, Respondent
observes that the right to arms protects two of the
most fundamental rights—the defense of one’s life
inside one’s home, and the defense of society against
tyrannical usurpation of authority. Petitioners’ casual
use of social science sharply underscores the importance
of securing Second Amendment rights with a
meaningful standard of review.
Finally, Petitioners’ contention that the Second
Amendment is not binding law within the Nation’s
capital is spurious.
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/march08.shtml collection of briefs, petitioner's(19) and respondent's(1).
