What does the law say about ignorance?

Miller v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 482, 487, 488-89 (Va. Ct.

App. 1997) (citing Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 439, 79 S. Ct.

1257, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1344 (1959)).

 The Miller court articulated the basic conflict here --

between the long-standing principle that "ignorance of the law is no

defense" and the inherent unfairness of an authority figure, here, a

sentencing judge, inadvertently misleading a defendant about his legal

obligations such that the defendant relied on this misinformation to his

detriment:

 Reflecting the axiom that everyone is "presumed to know the

 law," the common law rule that "ignorance of the law is no

 excuse" admitted of few exceptions. The common law position

 was based on the fact that most common law crimes were

 malum in se. Seen as "inherently and essentially evil

 without any regard to the fact of [their] being noticed or

 punished by the law of the state," Black's Law Dictionary 959

 (6th ed.1990), ignorance of the prohibition of such crimes was

 simply untenable. The rationale underlying the rule is less

 compelling for crimes that are malum prohibitum, viz.,

 acts that are "wrong because prohibited," not by virtue of

 their inherent character. Black's Law Dictionary 960 (6th ed.

 1990). Yet, the proposition that ignorance of the law is no

 excuse generally maintains with respect to crimes malum

 prohibitum, largely for pragmatic purposes. Although

 leading at times to seemingly "unfair" results, rigid

 application of the rule promotes the policy it serves: "to

 encourage people to learn and know the law." . . . E.g., . . .

 Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law 48 (1881) . . . .

 Nonetheless, "[w]ith `the increasing complexity of law, the

 multiplication of crimes mala prohibita, and a more

 exact definition of fundamental principles of criminal

 liability,' certain exceptions to the general rule have

 emerged." [/9]  . . . . The exception at issue addresses the

 legal consequences of a violation of the criminal law by an

 individual who takes measures to learn what conduct the

 government has proscribed, but is misadvised by the government

 itself. A number of states have adopted statutes bearing on

 the subject, but Virginia has not. [/10]



Miller, 492 S.E.2d at 485 (1997) /11  (citations omitted). /12

Nor has the State of Washington /13  adopted such a statute.

 We agree with Miller that the "ignorance of the law" axiom

should not automatically apply to malum prohibitum, such as

unlawful firearm possession, in those instances where the predicate

sentencing court has failed to follow the law requiring it to advise the

defendant that he may no longer possess firearms. The Miller

court referenced the United States Supreme Court's decision in

Raley, 360 U.S. 423, which found that a governmental

commission's representations to Raley were legally erroneous and

"active[ly] misleading," especially because the commission was "the voice

of the State most presently speaking to the [defendants]."