The analysis [of registration] is complicated by the constitutional protection of the individual right to bear arms in Heller. For this exercise, we have assumed that Heller is nullified or explained away. But for this discrete point, the timing of that nullification makes a difference. If the individual right were extinguished before the registration attempt, the analysis remains the same. People should defy registration on fear of confiscation. However, if registration is attempted during a temporary period of individual right protection, and then Heller is nullified, things change dramatically. Under that scenario, potentially large numbers of people will comply with registration, trusting that the Constitution bars confiscation. A large segment of no-paper guns might be brought within the system. Confiscation that follows, aided by the registration records gathered under the protection of Heller, should more effectively confront the remainder problem. [The remainder problem being the fact that there are a large number of handguns in the United States for which there is no government paperwork, and therefore would likely not be collected during a national confiscation effort.]
