Citizen
Founder's Club Member
imported post
This one is for Repeater and VAPlanter since they are so helpful posting new cases.
The upshot is that a conviction under the Lautenberg amendment (people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence are prohibited from possessing guns) stands.
Understand that there are two offenses here,the lateroffense hinge-ing on theexistence of an earlier offense:thelater offense--possession of a gun when the Lautenberg law said he weren't s'posed to;and the predicate offense--the previous domestic violence.
The question was whether the earlier offenseshould be a conviction for violatinga lawspecifically against"domestic violence", or whether the earlier offensewas just a conviction for violating a general law againstbattery, but the battered person just also happened to be a household member. Meaning, does thelawinvolved in the earlier convictionhave to expressly mentiondomestic violence? The SCOTUS says it does not.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-608.ZO.html
Holding:
The federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §921 et seq., has long prohibited possession of a firearm by any person convicted of a felony. In 1996, Congress extended the prohibition to include persons convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” §922(g)(9). The definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” contained in §921(a)(33)(A), is at issue in this case. Does that term cover a misdemeanor battery whenever the battered victim was in fact the offender’s spouse (or other relation specified in §921(a)(33)(A))? Or, to trigger the possession ban, must the predicate misdemeanor identify as an element of the crime a domestic relationship between aggressor and victim? We hold that the domestic relationship, although it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a §922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution, need not be a defining element of the predicate offense.
The dissentfrom Roberts and Scalia is a breath of fresh air:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-608.ZD.html
Dissent excerpt:
If the rule of lenity means anything, it is that an individual should not go to jail for failing to conduct a 50-state survey or comb through obscure legislative history. Ten years in jail is too much to hinge on the will-o’-the-wisp of statutory meaning pursued by the majority.
I found out about it at a great little blog by a very pro-gun lawyer:
http://www.armsandthelaw.com/
This one is for Repeater and VAPlanter since they are so helpful posting new cases.
The upshot is that a conviction under the Lautenberg amendment (people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence are prohibited from possessing guns) stands.
Understand that there are two offenses here,the lateroffense hinge-ing on theexistence of an earlier offense:thelater offense--possession of a gun when the Lautenberg law said he weren't s'posed to;and the predicate offense--the previous domestic violence.
The question was whether the earlier offenseshould be a conviction for violatinga lawspecifically against"domestic violence", or whether the earlier offensewas just a conviction for violating a general law againstbattery, but the battered person just also happened to be a household member. Meaning, does thelawinvolved in the earlier convictionhave to expressly mentiondomestic violence? The SCOTUS says it does not.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-608.ZO.html
Holding:
The federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §921 et seq., has long prohibited possession of a firearm by any person convicted of a felony. In 1996, Congress extended the prohibition to include persons convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” §922(g)(9). The definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” contained in §921(a)(33)(A), is at issue in this case. Does that term cover a misdemeanor battery whenever the battered victim was in fact the offender’s spouse (or other relation specified in §921(a)(33)(A))? Or, to trigger the possession ban, must the predicate misdemeanor identify as an element of the crime a domestic relationship between aggressor and victim? We hold that the domestic relationship, although it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a §922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution, need not be a defining element of the predicate offense.
The dissentfrom Roberts and Scalia is a breath of fresh air:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-608.ZD.html
Dissent excerpt:
If the rule of lenity means anything, it is that an individual should not go to jail for failing to conduct a 50-state survey or comb through obscure legislative history. Ten years in jail is too much to hinge on the will-o’-the-wisp of statutory meaning pursued by the majority.
I found out about it at a great little blog by a very pro-gun lawyer:
http://www.armsandthelaw.com/