Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a law enforcement officer has wide leeway during an investigatory stop. But, that wide leeway is not unlimited. A stop under Terry is limited by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and also limited by Article 1 Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. ORC §2921.29 is unconstitutional as written. ORC §2921.29(A) states in part “No person who is in a public place shall refuse to disclose the person’s name, address, or date of birth, when requested by a law enforcement officer who reasonably suspects either of the following:...” ORC §2921.29 goes well beyond the holding of Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, et al, 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
The U.S. Supreme Court in Hiibel stated that:
"Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, the Court has recognized that an officer's reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself during a Terry stop, see, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 229, it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer, see Brown, supra, at 53, n. 3. The Court is now of the view that Terry principles permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. Terry, supra, at 34. "
The Hiibel court made it abundantly clear that, until Hiibel, an open question existed as to whether a suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for the refusal to answer questions, ie a suspect exercising their Fifth Amendment right. Through Hiibel the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Terry principles permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. The Court did not extend that principle beyond the giving of the suspect's name.
ORC §2921.29 states “no person...shall refuse to disclose the person’s name, address, or date of birth.” The term “or” in Websters dictionary is a conjunction introducing an alternative. Thus, in plain English ORC §2921.29 allows a person to give one of the three alternatives which the Accused did, ie his name. The arresting officer in charging the Accused treated the term “or” as if it meant “and.” According to ORC §1.02(F) (“And” may be read “or,” and “or” may be read “and” if the sense requires it.) the officer was permitted to make such interpretation. The officer's interpretation, however, is in direct violation of ORC §1.42 which states in part “Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Accordingly, the application of ORC §2921.29(A) is in direct violation of Hiibel. Clearly, ORC §2921.29(A), when applied with the term “and” instead of “or”, has gone beyond what the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed under the Fourth Amendment and therefore, ORC §2921.29 as charged is unconstitutional.
