imported post
61.34 Powers of village board. (1) GENERAL GRANT.
Except as otherwise provided by law, the village board shall have
the management and control of the village property, finances,
highways, streets, navigable waters, and the public service, and
shall have power to act for the government and good order of the
village, for its commercial benefit and for the health, safety, welfare
and convenience of the public, and may carry its powers into
effect by license, regulation, suppression, borrowing, taxation,
special assessment, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, and other
necessary or convenient means. The powers hereby conferred
shall be in addition to all other grants and shall be limited only by
express language.
[ ...]
(5) CONSTRUCTION OF POWERS. For the purpose of giving to
villages the largest measure of self−government in accordance
with the spirit of article XI, section 3, of the constitution it is
hereby declared that this chapter shall be liberally construed in
favor of the rights, powers and privileges of villages to promote
the general welfare, peace, good order and prosperity of such villages
and the inhabitants thereof.
History: 1983 a. 192; 1987 a. 395; 1995 a. 27, 378; 1997 a. 27.
Cross−reference: See s. 118.105 for control of traffic on school premises.
When a municipality’s power to contract is improperly or irregularly exercised and
the municipality receives a benefit under the contract, it is estopped from asserting
the invalidity of the contract. Village of McFarland v. Town of Dunn, 82 Wis. 2d 469,
263 N.W.2d 167 (1978).
A village was authorized under ss. 30.77 (3) and 61.34 (1) to enact an ordinance
granting exclusive temporary use of a portion of a lake for public water exhibition
licensees. State v. Village of Lake Delton, 93 Wis. 2d 78, 286 N.W.2d 622 (Ct. App.
1979).
The delegation of village powers to a non−governmental entity is discussed. Save
Elkhart Lake v. Elkhart Lake Village, 181 Wis. 2d 778, 512 N.W.2d 202 (Ct. App.
1993).
The state regulatory scheme for tobacco sales preempts municipalities from adopting
regulations that are not in strict conformity with those of the state. U.S. Oil, Inc.
v. City of Fond du Lac, 199 Wis. 2d 333, 544 N.W.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1995), 95−0213.
It was not a violation of this section, s. 236.45, or the public purpose doctrine for
a municipality to assume the dual role of subdivider of property it owned and reviewer of the plat under ch. 236. Town of Beloit v. Rock County, 2001 WI App 256, 249 Wis. 2d 88, 637 N.W.2d 71, 00−1231. Affirmed on other grounds, 2003 WI 8, 259 Wis. 2d 37, 657 N.W.2d 344, 00−1231.
One who deals with a municipality does so at his or her own risk and may be subject
to any provisions of law that might prevent him or her from being paid by a municipality even though the services are rendered. Unless the power to bind the municipality financially has been specifically delegated, the only entity with the statutory authority to contract is the municipality. Holzbauer v. Safway Steel Products, Inc. 2005 WI App 240, 288 Wis. 2d 250, 711 N.W.2d 672, 04−2058.
State statutory enabling legislation is required to authorize enactment of typical
rent control ordinances. 62 Atty. Gen. 276.
Local units of government may not create and accumulate unappropriated surplus
funds. However, a local unit of government may maintain reasonable amounts necessary in the exercise of sound business principles to meet the immediate cash flow needs of the municipality during the current budgetary period or to accumulate
needed capital in non−lapsing funds to finance specifically identified future capital
expenditures. 76 Atty. Gen. 77. Article VIII, section 5 restricts the state from levying taxes to create a surplus having no public purpose. Although the constitutional provision does not apply directly to municipalities, the same limitation applies indirectly to them because the state cannot delegate more power than it has. 76 Atty. Gen. 77.
Conflicts between state statutes and local ordinances in Wisconsin. 1975 WLR
840
ETA after my lunch...
66.0409 Local regulation of firearms. (1) In this section:
(a) “Firearm” has the meaning given in s. 167.31 (1) (c).
(b) “Political subdivision” means a city, village, town or
county.
[ ...]
(2) Except as provided in subs. (3) and (4), no political subdivision
may enact an ordinance or adopt a resolution that regulates
the sale, purchase, purchase delay, transfer, ownership, use, keeping,
possession, bearing, transportation, licensing, permitting,
registration or taxation of any firearm or part of a firearm, including
ammunition and reloader components, unless the ordinance or
resolution is the same as or similar to, and no more stringent than,
a state statute.
(3)
[ ...]
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits a city, village or town that
is authorized to exercise village powers under s. 60.22 (3) from
enacting an ordinance or adopting a resolution that restricts the
discharge of a firearm.
Further (yes, I'm piling on), it was explained in my class on construction of ordinances that a judge will tie himself in knots to support the village's position as long as the village's intent, as 'legislative intent, is made clear.
