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G. Defendant Glastonbury is Liable to Plaintiff for His False Arrest and Unreasonable Search and Seizure Due to ItsFailure to Train Defendant Officers.
In addition to individual liability of Defendant Officers, “a municipality can be held liable for a constitutional injury inflicted pursuant to an official policy, practice, or custom of the municipality, including the failure to train or supervise lower-level employees.” Kennedy v. City of New York, 2010 WL 1779235 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2010) (attached hereto as Exhibit C) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Inadequate police training can give rise to §1983 liability for a municipality where “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). In evaluating a municipality’s liability for failure to train or adequately supervise, the Second Circuit has identified three requirements a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that a policymaker knows to a moral certainty that her employees will confront a given situation, excluding rare or unforeseen events; (2) that the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there is history of employees mishandling the situation; and (3) that the wrong choice by the city employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Faubel v. City of Stamford, 2010 WL 744930 (J.D. Fairfield Jan. 25, 2010) (citing Seri v. Town of Newtown, 573 F. Supp.2d 661 (D.Conn. 2008).
Clearly, Plaintiff satisfies the first element in that police officers are certain to confront individuals who carry open weapons in public in the State of Connecticut. Second, because Connecticut is an open carry state, its officers will be presented with a difficult choice of whether merely carrying an unconcealed handgun constitutes a breach of peace. Adequate training or supervision is likely to create a better understanding of what constitutes a breach of peace.
Lastly, as Defendant Furlong indicated, to him, merely carrying an unconcealed weapon in public is sufficient grounds for depriving an individual of his Fourth Amendment rights. Based on this assessment, Defendant Officers are likely to frequently cause the deprivation of individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Further, despite the fact that Plaintiff’s rights have clearly been violated, Defendant Glastonbury, through Police Chief Sweeney, acquiesced to Defendant Officers’ unlawful conduct. Chief Sweeney indicated that the Defendant Officers acted consistent with their training, and admits that even if there was a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Defendant Officers still acted consistent with their training. (Sweeney Depo. pp. 77-78).
Moreover, the State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety just recently issued a statement in order to protect the constitutional rights of individuals. (attached hereto as Exhibit D). As part of this statement, police officers are instructed that they “should not arrest a properly permitted individual merely for publicly carrying a handgun in plain view.” Consequently, it is clear that prior to the statement’s issuance, police officers were not adequately trained concerning an individual’s rights to be free from unlawful arrest and unreasonable search and seizure for merely carrying a handgun in plain view.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing case law, relevant authority, deposition, and documentary evidence, there are no issues of material fact as to whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights when they unlawfully arrested him, subjected him to an unreasonable search and seizure, subjected him to unreasonable and excessive force, and failed to properly train and supervise the police officers.
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court grant partial summary judgment as to liability only and set this action for a trial on his damages.
