Doug Huffman
Banned
We know that carjackings are frequently violent incidents causing reasonable fear of bodily harm during a carjacking and justifying (making righteous) self-defense. Evidence can be discovered during trial preparation.
We are talking hypothetically, right? Because we shouldn't discuss Jesus's case.
Anyhow, hypothetically, does this mean that the defendant has to know that the potential attackers had previously done dangerous/illegal things or is this a post incident judgement?
We know that carjackings are frequently violent incidents causing reasonable fear of bodily harm during a carjacking and justifying (making righteous) self-defense. Evidence can be discovered during trial preparation.
http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_is_Great_Bodily_Harm said:The term "great bodily harm" forms the basis of many statutory definitions regarding the implied use of deadly or lethal force. Regrettably, statutes remain obscure as to what actual types of injuries constitute a judgment that great bodily harm has occurred. A search of case law shows that most determinations of great bodily harm are decided on a case-by-case basis, left up to a judge or jury to evaluate and declare.
Some examples of great bodily harm cited by the court include:
1. scarring 2. permanent disfigurement 3. broken bones 4. Extended hospital stays (in one case "extended" was meant to mean overnight.
I can only imagine what Iggy_Kist must have written, but you have found the point, that legal quibbles are for legal asses to ride to work. I-ANAL I am retired.
SNIP You had better be justified in using deadly force before you even draw your firearm.
My point is that you should not draw if it is obvious that deadly force is not going to be warranted. Someone verbally threatening you for instance.I have no information that anyone is legally required to have justification for lethal force before even drawing their weapon.
If a person is in the right situation, waiting for justification to shoot to even draw the gun might well be too late. A simple example is being verbally threatened with a brandished knife inside 21 feet, and beyond lunging distance, without the threat actually yet moving to close the distance. Such a circumstance still lacks the "jeopardy/intent" element of AOJ. .
I agree.The annotation maybe does assume that the defendant knew of the victim's violent past. It does not stipulate how the defendant must know of that factual evidence. It could be from third person conversation, media reporting, court records, a number of sources. There is no stipulation in the annotation that the factual evidence can only be known acts committed on the defendant by the victim.
That's what the case and, hopefully, trial will be about. Intent of something is obvious by going armed. Jesus was not charged with murder
The Wisconsin Judicial Council calls it "analogous", quite different from 'identical with' (that "==" signifies in some formal notations). The details of his charges are in WCCA Milwaukee case No. 2010CF002323
was convicted on September 11, 1969, of the
charges of first-degree murder, a violation of sec. 940.01, Stats.,
and armed robbery, under sec. 943.32(2).
A. Wisconsin's Law of Homicide
¶54 The law of homicide in Wisconsin was revised in 1988. 1987 Wis. Act 399. Prior to the revision, Chapter 940 listed nine homicide offenses, including first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter. Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01, 940.02, 940.05 (1985-86).
¶55 Section 940.01(1), first-degree murder, read as follows: "Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A felony." Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (1985-86). Subsection (2) defined "intent to kill" to mean "the mental purpose to take the life of another human being." Wis. Stat. § 940.02 (1985-86). This two-element offense was punishable by life imprisonment. Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(a) (1985-86).
¶56 Section 940.02, second-degree murder, prohibited the causing of death:
(1) By conduct imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life; or
(2) As a natural and probable consequence of the commission of or attempt to commit a felony.
Wis. Stat. § 940.02 (1985-86). Second-degree murder was a Class B felony punishable by imprisonment not to exceed 20 years. Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(b) (1985-86).
¶57 Section 940.05, manslaughter, prohibited the causing of death:
(1) Without intent to kill and while in the heat of passion; or
(2) Unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense or defense of others or the privilege to prevent or terminate the commission of a felony; or
(3) Because such person is coerced by threats made by someone other than his coconspirator and which cause him reasonably to believe that his act is the only means of preventing imminent death to himself or another; or
(4) Because the pressure of natural physical forces causes such person reasonably to believe that his act is the only means of preventing imminent public disaster or imminent death to himself or another.
Wis. Stat. § 940.05 (1985-86). Manslaughter was a Class C felony punishable by imprisonment not to exceed 10 years. Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(c) (1985-86).
¶58 The 1988 revision categorizes homicides based upon the degree of culpability involved, as reflected in the mental element required for each offense. Three of the framers of the revision——Walter Dickey, David Schultz, and James L. Fullin, Jr.——describe four gradations of mental element as follows:
(1) The mental element is intentional when the actor has the purpose to cause death or is aware that death is practically certain to be caused by the conduct [Wis. Stat. § 939.23];
(2) The mental element is aggravated recklessness when the actor is aware that the conduct creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life [Wis. Stat. §§ 939.24, 940.02];
(3) The mental element is simple recklessness when the actor is aware that the conduct creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another [Wis. Stat. § 939.24];
(4) The mental element is negligence when the actor should realize that the conduct creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to another [Wis. Stat. § 939.25].
Walter Dickey, David Schultz & James L. Fullin, Jr., The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1323, 1330 [hereinafter The Importance of Clarity].
¶59 These different mental elements are now embodied in different homicide statutes carrying different penalties.
¶60 This case concerns an alleged intentional homicide. Intentional homicides are divided into two categories, first-degree and second-degree. First-degree intentional homicide, Wis. Stat. § 940.01, replaced first-degree murder, Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (1985-86).