kimber10mm
Regular Member
anty is reindicted
-
We are now running on a new, and hopefully much-improved, server. In addition we are also on new forum software. Any move entails a lot of technical details and I suspect we will encounter a few issues as the new server goes live. Please be patient with us. It will be worth it! :) Please help by posting all issues here.
-
If you are having trouble seeing the forum then you may need to clear your browser's DNS cache. Click here for instructions on how to do that
-
Please review the Forum Rules frequently as we are constantly trying to improve the forum for our members and visitors.
indicted again
- Thread starter kimber10mm
- Start date
4angrybadgers
Regular Member
Do you have a link to a news story? I haven't found one yet...
edit: Derp derp derp. Google News turns up an 8-hour-old article as the first result. http://www.wxvt.com/Global/story.asp?S=13196166
edit: Derp derp derp. Google News turns up an 8-hour-old article as the first result. http://www.wxvt.com/Global/story.asp?S=13196166
Last edited:
charlie12
Regular Member
I guess that proves it ain't over til the fat lady sings. 
kimber10mm
Regular Member
big write up in the advocate for 9-22 page 5B
4angrybadgers
Regular Member
http://www.2theadvocate.com/news/103498054.html?showAll=y&c=y
Had to search the Advocate's site for his last name - the article wasn't showing up in the normal listings.
Slidell Jim
Regular Member
audio recording?
“I don’t know what the grand jury heard, but I don’t think they heard the iPhone recording where Manzella is either begging for his life, not to shoot him, or ‘take my keys, take this,’” Gill said.
This is the first time i heard mention of an audio recording for this case. Had I just missed it in discussions before? If there is really an iphone recording of Anty begging for his life, WOW! It sounds to me like a open-shut case for the defense. I know it's never that simple, but WOW (again).
“I don’t know what the grand jury heard, but I don’t think they heard the iPhone recording where Manzella is either begging for his life, not to shoot him, or ‘take my keys, take this,’” Gill said.
This is the first time i heard mention of an audio recording for this case. Had I just missed it in discussions before? If there is really an iphone recording of Anty begging for his life, WOW! It sounds to me like a open-shut case for the defense. I know it's never that simple, but WOW (again).
JeepSeller
Regular Member
I really don't think it's so "open and shut". He shot the guy while he, himself, was committing a criminal act.
The REAL question will end up being, does one still have the right to self defense during the commission of a criminal act?
In other words, does the criminal climbing in your window have the right to shoot you and claim self defense when he realizes you have produced a gun to defend your family?
It really all depends if the fact he was in the middle of a criminal act is allowed as evidence. If so, I wouldn't expect a jury to have much sympathy for him to be blunt.
The REAL question will end up being, does one still have the right to self defense during the commission of a criminal act?
In other words, does the criminal climbing in your window have the right to shoot you and claim self defense when he realizes you have produced a gun to defend your family?
It really all depends if the fact he was in the middle of a criminal act is allowed as evidence. If so, I wouldn't expect a jury to have much sympathy for him to be blunt.
Snakemathis
Regular Member
I could be wrong, but if someone dies durring the commission of a crime, doesnt it automatically become murder? I mean, this is the only way that the driver of a getaway car can be charged with murder if the passenger kills a person during a street mugging, but I have heard of it happening on multiple occassions.
charlie12
Regular Member
Louisiana RS 14:30
§30. First degree murder
A. First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, assault by drive-by shooting, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, terrorism, cruelty to juveniles, or second degree cruelty to juveniles.
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a fireman, peace officer, or civilian employee of the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory or any other forensic laboratory engaged in the performance of his lawful duties, or when the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm is directly related to the victim's status as a fireman, peace officer, or civilian employee.
(3) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person.
(4) When the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and has offered, has been offered, has given, or has received anything of value for the killing.
(5) When the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who is under the age of twelve or sixty-five years of age or older.
(6) When the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm while engaged in the distribution, exchange, sale, or purchase, or any attempt thereof, of a controlled dangerous substance listed in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.
(7) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the activities prohibited by R.S. 14:107.1(C)(1).
(8) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and there has been issued by a judge or magistrate any lawful order prohibiting contact between the offender and the victim in response to threats of physical violence or harm which was served on the offender and is in effect at the time of the homicide.
(9) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who was a witness to a crime or was a member of the immediate family of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and:
(a) The killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether or not such action or proceeding had been commenced; or
(b) The killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for the victim's prior testimony.
(10) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and the offender has previously acted with a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm that resulted in the killing of one or more persons.
B.(1) For the purposes of Paragraph (A)(2) of this Section, the term "peace officer" means any peace officer, as defined in R.S. 40:2402, and includes any constable, marshal, deputy marshal, sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or state policeman, commissioned wildlife enforcement agent, federal law enforcement officer, jail or prison guard, parole officer, probation officer, judge, attorney general, assistant attorney general, attorney general's investigator, district attorney, assistant district attorney, or district attorney's investigator.
(2) For the purposes of Paragraph (A)(9) of this Section, the term "member of the immediate family" means a husband, wife, father, mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent, stepchild, or grandchild.
(3) For the purposes of Paragraph (A)(9) of this Section, the term "witness" means any person who has testified or is expected to testify for the prosecution, or who, by reason of having relevant information, is subject to call or likely to be called as a witness for the prosecution, whether or not any action or proceeding has yet commenced.
C. Penalty provisions.
(1) If the district attorney seeks a capital verdict, the offender shall be punished by death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, in accordance with the determination of the jury. The provisions of C.Cr.P. Art 782 relative to cases in which punishment may be capital shall apply.
(2) If the district attorney does not seek a capital verdict, the offender shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The provisions of C.Cr.P. Art 782 relative to cases in which punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall apply.
Amended by Acts 1973, No. 109, §1; Acts 1975, No. 327, §1; Acts 1976, No. 657, §1; Acts 1979, No. 74, §1, eff. June 29, 1979; Acts 1985, No. 515, §1; Acts 1987, No. 654, §1; Acts 1987, No. 862, §1; Acts 1988, No. 779, §2, eff. July 18, 1988; Acts 1989, No. 373, §1; Acts 1989, No. 637, §2; Acts 1990, No. 526, §1; Acts 1992, No. 296, §1; Acts 1993, No. 244, §1; Acts 1993, No. 496, §1; Acts 1999, No. 579, §1; Acts 1999, No. 1359, §1; Acts 2001, No. 1056, §1; Acts 2002, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 128, §2; Acts 2003, No. 1223, §1; Acts 2004, No. 145, §1; Acts 2004, No. 649, §1; Acts 2006, No. 53, §1; Acts 2007, No. 125, §1; Acts 2009, No. 79, §1, eff. June 18, 2009.
georg jetson
Regular Member
Legally, the question will end up being "what does the law say???"
sraacke
Regular Member
...
4angrybadgers
Regular Member
Also germane to the case is RS 14:20:
§20. Justifiable homicide
A. A homicide is justifiable:
(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.
(2) When committed for the purpose of preventing a violent or forcible felony involving danger to life or of great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is about to be committed and that such action is necessary for its prevention. The circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fear of a reasonable person that there would be serious danger to his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the felony without the killing.
(3) When committed against a person whom one reasonably believes to be likely to use any unlawful force against a person present in a dwelling or a place of business, or when committed against a person whom one reasonably believes is attempting to use any unlawful force against a person present in a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40), while committing or attempting to commit a burglary or robbery of such dwelling, business, or motor vehicle.
(4)(a) When committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling, a place of business, or a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40), against a person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, and the person committing the homicide reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to leave the premises or motor vehicle.
(b) The provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply when the person committing the homicide is engaged, at the time of the homicide, in the acquisition of, the distribution of, or possession of, with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation of the provisions of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.
B. For the purposes of this Section, there shall be a presumption that a person lawfully inside a dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle held a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent unlawful entry thereto, or to compel an unlawful intruder to leave the premises or motor vehicle, if both of the following occur:
(1) The person against whom deadly force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.
(2) The person who used deadly force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had occurred.
C. A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force as provided for in this Section, and may stand his or her ground and meet force with force.
D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used deadly force had a reasonable belief that deadly force was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent a violent or forcible felony involving life or great bodily harm or to prevent the unlawful entry.
Added by Acts 1976, No. 655, §1. Amended by Acts 1977, No. 392, §1; Acts 1983, No. 234, §1; Acts 1993, No. 516, §1; Acts 1997, No. 1378, §1; Acts 2003, No. 660, §1; Acts 2006, No. 141, §1.
The key here is (4)(b) - does it apply to all of A, or just (4)? Given the hierarchical format in which the laws are structured, it appears that when (4)(b) says "this Paragraph" it only applies to (4); leaving (1) - (3) as valid defenses even if you're in violation of the UCDSL.A. A homicide is justifiable:
(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.
(2) When committed for the purpose of preventing a violent or forcible felony involving danger to life or of great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is about to be committed and that such action is necessary for its prevention. The circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fear of a reasonable person that there would be serious danger to his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the felony without the killing.
(3) When committed against a person whom one reasonably believes to be likely to use any unlawful force against a person present in a dwelling or a place of business, or when committed against a person whom one reasonably believes is attempting to use any unlawful force against a person present in a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40), while committing or attempting to commit a burglary or robbery of such dwelling, business, or motor vehicle.
(4)(a) When committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling, a place of business, or a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40), against a person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, and the person committing the homicide reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to leave the premises or motor vehicle.
(b) The provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply when the person committing the homicide is engaged, at the time of the homicide, in the acquisition of, the distribution of, or possession of, with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation of the provisions of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.
B. For the purposes of this Section, there shall be a presumption that a person lawfully inside a dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle held a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent unlawful entry thereto, or to compel an unlawful intruder to leave the premises or motor vehicle, if both of the following occur:
(1) The person against whom deadly force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.
(2) The person who used deadly force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had occurred.
C. A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force as provided for in this Section, and may stand his or her ground and meet force with force.
D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used deadly force had a reasonable belief that deadly force was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent a violent or forcible felony involving life or great bodily harm or to prevent the unlawful entry.
Added by Acts 1976, No. 655, §1. Amended by Acts 1977, No. 392, §1; Acts 1983, No. 234, §1; Acts 1993, No. 516, §1; Acts 1997, No. 1378, §1; Acts 2003, No. 660, §1; Acts 2006, No. 141, §1.
Old Grump
Regular Member
The point is he was committing an illegal act and a death occurred because of his actions. He should have been charged with murder in the first place. Somehow I have a feeling his childhood was very troubled and he should have never been able to carry a gun legally to begin with. His previous reactions with the police and his words on the internet will hang him out to dry and once more is a reason why you should be very careful about what you write before you hit the enter key.
KBCraig
Regular Member
Under LRS 14:20, no, you don't.
It's never justifiable when you create the situation (you can't start a fight and then claim self defense when the other person fights back).
In this case, Anty was defending himself against armed robbery. If he'd gone to that house to buy a car, or a dog, or a gun, or a lawnmower, he would be legally justified. But the law says he's not allowed to defend himself if he's buying an illegal substance at the time.
To use your burglar analogy more accurately, let's suppose you're sitting at home when a burglar breaks in, and you shoot and kill him. During the investigation, the police notice a bottle of oxycontin pills in your kitchen, past the expiration date, and the prescription was made out to your mother-in-law. Congratulations, you're now a murderer in Louisiana because you illegally possessed a controlled substance at the time of the shooting.
eb31
Regular Member
Was the moron being indicted a member here? lol
georg jetson
Regular Member
Yes you do according to 14:20... read it again...
Paragraph 1 of part (A) applies here if the facts have been correctly relayed...
A. A homicide is justifiable:
(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.
Paragraph 2 through 4 are not needed in this case... remember this law is used by the defense. Paragraph 4 of part (A) is irrelevant because of this. If the defendant was preventing an unlawful entry, then one COULD use (A)(4) and then (4)(a) and (b) would apply.
Part C applies if it can be shown that the defendant had an opportunity to retreat. It applies to the duty tor RETREAT only.
In the analogy above, 14:20 can be used because of the explanation above. However, even if part (A) paragraph (4)b applied, the language INCLUDES "with intent to distribute". It would have to be shown that you intended to "distribute" your oxycodone.
This piece of legislation has been amended many times since 1976 and this has created confusion.
KBCraig
Regular Member
I see where you're coming from, but one of us is using incorrect terminology. And I'm not sure which one, so I'll defer to someone more experienced in LRS code construction.
It's an issue of how the parts of the legislation are nested. As I understand it:
14 is the Chapter
20 is the Section
A is the Paragraph
4 is the Part or Subparagraph (not sure what term LA uses here)
So, when 14:20(A)(4)(b) says "The provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply" when a person is engaged in a drug crime, the Paragraph is "A", not "A(4)(a)".
And honestly, that makes more sense. Why forfeit the right to a finding of justifiable homicide just for cases of carjacking or home invasion? If they intended to apply it to everyone dealing or possession or acquiring illegal drugs, it would apply at all times. And I think that's what they did.
But again, I welcome clarification from someone who knows if I'm right or wrong about which portion is the "Paragraph".
georg jetson
Regular Member
Last edited: