IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
WISCONSIN CARRY, INC.,
BRAD CHAPIEWSKY,
BENJAMIN MOYES,
LARRY HERZOG and
WILLIAM J. VEERHUSEN,
Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 10-CV-548
v.
CITY OF MADISON, WISCONSIN
and NOBLE WRAY, In his official capacity
as Chief of Police of the City of Madison
Wisconsin,
Defendants.
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
I. INTRODUCTION.
The District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs do not have
standing to sue.
This action arises out of an encounter by Madison Police Department officers with five
armed individuals at a Culver's Restaurant. The plaintiffs claim that this incident resulted in
constitutional violations by the police officers, pursuant to an alleged policy of the Madison
Police Department. None of the individuals involved in the encounter with Madison police
officers, however, is a party to this action. The named plaintiffs, by contrast, did not have any
contact with Madison police officers.
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 1 of 152
Any future encounter between the named plaintiffs and Madison police officers is
speculative and uncertain. The individual plaintiffs, therefore, do not have pre-enforcement
standing. The plaintiff, Wisconsin Carry, Inc. ("Wisconsin Carry"), also does not have standing
in its representative capacity because its members do not have individual standing. Neither does
Wisconsin Carry have organizational standing, which requires that a discrete injury-in-fact be
inflicted on the organization's own legally protected interests.
The plaintiffs seek no more than an advisory opinion, which the Court cannot provide in
the absence of a case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The plaintiffs filed the pending lawsuit after an encounter between Madison Police
Department officers and five armed individuals at Culver's Restaurant in Madison, Wisconsin,
on September 18, 2010. (Complaint, ¶¶17-18.) The armed individuals at Culver's were Paul L.
Fisher of Elkhorn, Matthew S. Lutz of Mauston, Steven M. Jensen of Racine, Shawn M. Winrich
of Madison, and Frank R. Hamman-Rock of Racine. (Bolton Aff., ¶4.) None of these
individuals is a plaintiff in the pending lawsuit.
Enforcement of the City's alleged policy against the named plaintiffs is not certain or
imminent. The City's alleged policy also has not been enforced against Wisconsin Carry, which
is included as a plaintiff in its representative capacity. Wisconsin Carry is a non-profit
corporation whose purposes include promoting the free exercise of the right to keep and bear
arms for its members and securing those rights through education and litigation. (Complaint,
¶1.)
The plaintiffs have denominated their initial pleading as a "Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief." (See Complaint.) They seek an injunction against the defendants
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 2 of 153
prohibiting them from enforcing alleged practices and policies of the Madison Police Department
that are identified in the Complaint. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment that prospective
enforcement of such alleged police policies would violate their constitutional rights. They
demand damages in an amount to be determined at trial, although the individual plaintiffs have
not themselves been subject to any enforcement action by the defendants.
III. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO SUE, WHICH IS FATAL TO THE
DISTRICT COURT'S SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
A. Prospective Injunctive Relief Requires An Imminent Direct Injury.
Standing is an essential requirement of subject matter jurisdiction. Here, the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs do not have standing. The plaintiffs have not
suffered an injury-in-fact. Instead, they are seeking an advisory opinion from the Court.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the Complaint. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to deciding cases or controversies. Scheibe v. National Board of Medical
Examiners, 424 F. Supp.2d 1140, 1144 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (plaintiff sought ADA
accommodations). Standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case or controversy
requirement of Article III. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (standing
addressed for claimed environmental injuries).
To meet the case or controversy requirement, a party must show that he has suffered an
"injury in fact" that is "concrete," "distinct and palpable," and "actual or imminent," as opposed
to "conjectural" or "hypothetical." Scheibe, 424 F.2d at 1144, quoting McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003). Where, as in this case, a plaintiff seeks
prospective injunctive relief, he or she must show that he is in "immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury." Scheibe, 424 F.2d at 144, quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,. 461 U.S.
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 3 of 154
95, 102 (1983); Sierakowski v. Ryan, 223 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2000) (Plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief must show "significant likelihood and immediacy of sustaining some direct
injury").
In Scheibe, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 1144-45, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's request for
prospective injunctive relief because the plaintiff faced only the speculative possibility of future
harm, which was not sufficient to support standing to seek injunctive relief. The Court cited
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 110, and also relied on Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1037 (7th Cir.
1993) ("Evidence of past wrongs alone is insufficient to merit equitable relief") and Hoepfl v.
Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317, 320 (E. Dist. Va. 1995) ("Established standing rules preclude a
plaintiff from obtaining injunctive relief based only on events that occurred in the past, even if
the past events amounted to a violation of federal law."). The Court then concluded in Scheibe
that the plaintiff "must prove that he is in imminent danger of being denied an accommodation
by defendant in the future." 424 F. Supp. 2d at 1144. The undisputed facts indicated, however,
that the plaintiff could not meet this burden.
In reaching its decision in Scheibe, the Court relied upon the Supreme Court's decisions
in Lyons and O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 484 (1974). In Lyons, the plaintiff sued the City of
Los Angeles and several police officers, alleging that the officers stopped him for a routine
traffic violation and applied a choke hold without provocation. He sought an injunction against
future use of the choke hold unless the suspect threatened bodily force. The Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because he could not show a real or
immediate threat of future harm. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105. The Court relied upon its earlier
decision in O'Shea in which the Court stated that "past exposure to illegal conduct does not in
itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 4 of 155
continuing, present adverse effects." O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 495-96. In O'Shea, the plaintiffs had
alleged discriminatory enforcement of certain criminal laws. The Court held there was no case
and controversy because "the threat to plaintiffs was not sufficiently real and immediate." Id at
496-97. Similarly, in Lyons, the Court found that, although an allegation of an earlier choking
was sufficient to confer standing for a damage claim, it did "nothing to establish a real and
immediate threat" that the plaintiff would again be stopped for a traffic violation and a choke
hold put on him. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105.
Speculative future claims do not provide a basis for Article III standing because federal
courts cannot give advisory opinions or resolve abstract legal questions. Wisconsin Right to
Life, Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183, 1185 (7th Cir. 1998) (involving registration of advocacy
organization under election laws). A party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court,
therefore, has the burden to show affirmatively that he or she raises a live case or controversy.
See Tobin for Governor v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 527 (7th Cir. 2001),
citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101. When a party seeks a determination of the constitutionality of a
statute or governmental policy, the case or controversy rule requires the party to present the
constitutional question in the context of a specific and live grievance. J.N.S., Inc. v. State, 712
F.2d 303, 305 (7th Cir. 1983); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991) (holding that plaintiff
must demonstrate a live dispute).
None of the individual plaintiffs in the present case was involved in the encounter with
Madison Police officers at Culver's on September 18, 2010. The individual plaintiffs, therefore,
do not have any claim for past damages. They seek only a prospective declaration as to the
defendants' alleged policy. The individual plaintiffs' standing, as a result, must be evaluated as a
pre-enforcement challenge to the City's alleged policy. Plaintiffs must show that future
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 5 of 156
enforcement against them is certain or imminent. See Crosetto v. State Bar, 12 F.3d 1396, 1403
(7th Cir. 1993) (involving claims against State Bar Assn.).
When application of an alleged municipal policy depends on contingent future events, the
plaintiffs' claims cannot be adjudicated. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 301 (1998);
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981); Lucien v. Jockish, 133 F.3d 464, 469 (7th
Cir. 1998); Solo Cup Company v. Federal Insurance Company, 619 F.2d 1178, 1189 (7th Cir.
1980); see also J. N. S., Inc. v. State, 712 F.2d 303, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) ("It is insufficient that an
actual controversy may occur in the future; it must presently exist in fact."). The plaintiffs must
show that enforcement is certain, or that the challenged policy causes the plaintiffs a present
concrete hardship, in order for their claim for injunctive relief to be adjudicated. See Toilet
Goods Association v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164 (1967) (involving review of federal regulations
of cosmetics). Prospective relief, therefore, would not even be available in the present case for
the individuals involved in the prior police encounter. "Unless the same events are likely to
happen again to him, there is no controversy between him and the City about the City's future
handling of other arrests." Campbell v. Miller, 373 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2004) (challenging
police body cavity search policy), citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975).
Here, the individual plaintiffs represent their own interests, and they cannot bootstrap the
hypothetical past claims of third parties as a basis for their standing. Only if these plaintiffs are
certain in the future to encounter Madison police regarding open carry of a gun would
prospective injunctive relief be potentially appropriate. That is not the case, and so these
plaintiffs may not pursue such relief in this Court. Campbell, 373 F.3d at 836.
Standing to pursue injunctive relief would not exist even for the five armed individuals
who actually encountered Madison police officers at Culver's. In order to have standing to seek
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 6 of 157
prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show a reasonable prospect of future arrest in
circumstances like those about which a past complaint has been made. See Goldhamer v.
Nagode, 621 F.3d 581, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18325 at 10-16 (7th Cir. 2010). In Goldhamer,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that standing to pursue claims for damages based on an alleged
unlawful arrest did not include the plaintiff's facial challenge requesting an injunction against
future enforcement of a city ordinance. "A plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for
each form of relief sought." Id at 8, quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000); accord Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109 (plaintiff had standing to seek
damages, but not injunctive relief against alleged police practices).
The fact that five individuals who once encountered Madison police were charged with
disorderly conduct does not prove that these plaintiffs, or even the former five, have standing to
seek injunctive relief. On the contrary, "as a general rule, the fact that a person was previously
prosecuted for violating a law is insufficient by itself to establish that person's standing to request
injunctive relief." Goldhamer, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS at 10; see also Steel Company v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 108 (1998) (standing to request injunctive relief is
lacking when only past harm is alleged); O'Shea, 414 at 495-96 (past exposure to illegal conduct
does not by itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief); Lyons, 461
U.S. at 111 (no standing to request injunctive relief where plaintiff could not show he had reason
to expect to be arrested and subjected to controversial choke-hold again); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 372 (1976) (plaintiffs lacked standing to obtain injunctive relief against senior police
officials to impose tighter police discipline to prevent harm to civilians).
The plaintiffs in the present case merely speculate that they will be subject to an
encounter with Madison police in circumstances involving the City's alleged open carry policy.
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 7 of 158
A threatened injury, however, must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact. In White
v. United States, 601 Fed.3d 545, 553 (6th Cir. 2010), the Court described such an attenuated
situation in which the risk of future discriminatory practices was too remote to confer standing:
The plaintiffs' allegations of potential false prosecution amount to
a claim, that, if they transport or sell chickens across state lines for
non-fighting purposes, and if they are stopped by law enforcement
authorities, the authorities may misinterpret the plaintiffs' intent
and wrongly prosecute them. This claim, accordingly, bears some
similarity to the allegations presented in O'Shea vs. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974), which the
Supreme Court found insufficient for standing. In O'Shea, the
plaintiff sought injunctive relief against two judges who allegedly
were engaged in "a continuing pattern and practice" of
discriminatory and unconstitutional bond-setting sentencing and
mandating of fee payments. Id. at 491-92. The Court found that
these allegations amounted to a claim "that if respondents proceed
to violate an unchallenged law and if they are charged, held to
answer and tried in any proceeding before [the judges] they'll be
subjected to discriminatory practices that [the judges] are alleged
to have followed. Id. at 497. As in O'Shea, the chain of events
necessary for the plaintiffs to suffer false prosecution in this case
veers "into the area of speculation and conjecture." Id. In the
district court's words, the "plaintiffs' pleading as to the scenario of
events that must unfold to injure them - their allegations that they
might incur injury in the future if the law is not properly followed
and if their intentions are misconstrued - is simply too . . . highly
conjectural" to present a threat of immediate injury, as the
allegations "rest on a string of actions the occurrence of which is
merely speculative."
B. Claimed Subjective "Chilling" Of Second Amendment Rights
Does Not Provide A Basis For Standing.
The claimed "chilling effect" on the exercise of Second Amendment rights also does not
provide a basis for standing by these plaintiffs. As the Court stated in White: "Nor does the
'chill' on the plaintiffs' right of travel, right of association, and 'right to be free of bills of
attainder,' which the plaintiff claims results from their fear of false prosecution, suffice for
standing. Our jurisprudence assumes that only the chilling of First Amendment rights may
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 8 of 159
confer standing." Id. at 554. In fact, no decision has been found in which a court based standing
on a claimed "chilling" effect on Second Amendment rights.
Where a plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief to remedy a First Amendment
violation, moreover, even a subjective fear will not suffice for standing without a real and
immediate threat of future harm. With respect to the standing of First Amendment litigants, the
Supreme Court is emphatic: "Allegations of a subjective chill are not an adequate substitute for
a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." Laird vs. Tatum,
408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) (addressing chilling of First Amendment speech rights); see also
Dermer v. Miami-Dade County, 599 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2010) (Although the injury
requirement is more loosely applied in challenges under the First Amendment, "we have
repeatedly stressed that when seeking prospective relief, an injury must be imminent.").
The alleged "chilling effect" of defendants' policy in this case does not provide a basis for
plaintiffs' standing to sue because the plaintiffs do not allege a First Amendment prior restraint
on speech, and because they allege only a supposed chilling effect that is purely subjective. The
plaintiffs do not allege that they are forced to assume any concrete or particularized burden. In
fact, the plaintiffs do not even allege that they will, in fact, be deterred from going about openlyarmed in the future.
C. The Myriad Factual Circumstances Of Police Encounters Cannot Be Judged
In The Abstract.
The jurisdiction of federal courts is "properly limited" for good reason, as this case makes
clear. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (discussing standing to challenge tax
exemption for private schools that racially discriminate). Rather than operating as free-wheeling
enforcers of the Constitution and laws, federal courts are limited to hearing those matters
involving cases and controversies in which plaintiffs have suffered an injury in fact that is fairly
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 9 of 1510
traceable to the challenged action of defendants, and which is redressable by a favorable
decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. In the case of facial challenges involving prospective
relief, the question of standing is particularly important because the Court is adjudicating for a
future course in uncertain circumstances.
In the present case, the Court is asked to adjudicate a variety of complex issues in a
factual vacuum, including: whether or in what circumstances may police question openly-armed
citizens; whether an openly-armed individual, considering the totality of the circumstances, may
be charged with disorderly conduct; whether being openly-armed, considered in the totality of
the circumstances, may give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain an
individual; whether and how the police may respond to citizen reports of openly-armed
individuals; and what actions may the police take for public and officer safety when
encountering and questioning openly-armed individuals. These are among the issues that the
Court must address in deciding a facial challenge to the defendants' alleged policy regarding
open carry.
The factual circumstances of future encounters with police, if any, are unknown and
unpredictable in the abstract, and as presented to the Court -- but the facts make a difference.
For example, police do not need probable cause or reasonable suspicion in order to question
citizens during an encounter not involving a seizure or detention. A person is "seized" by the
police when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, restrains the person's
freedom of movement. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (involving
constitutionality of search during traffic stop). In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-415
(1997), moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that police officers may take precautionary
measures during encounters, without reasonable suspicion. The Court reasoned that the risk of
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 10 of 1511
harm to both the police and the public "is minimized if officers routinely exercise unquestioned
command of the situation." In other circumstances, the Supreme Court also has consistently
recognized the importance of public and officer safety during citizen encounters, including
during investigative stops, as involved in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Supreme Court
similarly has recognized a "public safety exception" to the requirement of giving Miranda
warnings. Under the "public safety" exception to Miranda, established in New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1994), police officers can ask questions without first giving Miranda warnings if
they reasonably believe it is necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public. In
United States v. Daniels, 590 F.3d 499, 505-06 (7th Cir. 2009), the Court held that questioning a
suspect about whether he had a gun fell within the Quarles public safety exception.
The issues raised in this case are best addressed in the factual context of specific cases, so
that public and officer safety can be properly included when assessing police conduct during
encounters with armed individuals. That is why federal courts are limited in jurisdiction to
adjudicating only cases and controversies. The Court then is not forced to render advisory
opinions about uncertain hypothetical and speculative future situations.
The plaintiffs in this case are asking the Court to define limits on police encounters with
openly-armed individuals as an abstract matter. The plaintiffs are requesting the Court to
determine, without limitation to any particular factual context, that the police should show no
heightened awareness of openly-armed individuals. This ignores the reality that guns are
dangerous instrumentalities, which is a fact not altered by the right to bear arms in certain
contexts.
How the right to bear arms interfaces with legitimate concerns for public and officer
safety cannot and should not be determined in the abstract. That is why Article III limits district
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 11 of 1512
court jurisdiction to actual cases and controversy. Here, the constitutional predicate for the
Court's jurisdiction is lacking, and it would be precipitous for the Court to render an advisory
opinion in a matter requiring the careful consideration of multiple important interests in many
diverse factual settings.
IV. WISCONSIN CARRY, INC., DOES NOT HAVE INDEPENDENT STANDING TO
SUE.
Wisconsin Carry claims to predicate its standing on both representational and
organizational injury. Neither claimed basis, however, provides a legal basis for the Court to
exercise jurisdiction in this matter.
An organization only can assert standing on a representative basis when its members can
sue in their own right, and when the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose,
and when neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested require the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit. Bensman v. United States Forest Service, 408 F.3d 945, 949
(7th Cir. 2005); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167
(2000); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
Wisconsin Carry lacks representative standing because its individual members do not
have standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. If an organization does not allege a discrete
and palpable injury to itself, the assertion of standing cannot be different from the standing of the
members that the organization represents. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Zielke,
845 F.2d 1463, 1469 (7th Cir. 1988).
Assuming that Wisconsin Carry also devotes resources to promoting the right to bear
arms for its members, and works to secure those rights through education and litigation, the use
of such resources nonetheless does not constitute an injury-in-fact for purposes of organizational
standing. Virtually every advocacy group in the country, on any issue within its purview,
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 12 of 1513
otherwise would have automatic standing, a result that is inconsistent with the rule that a
"setback to an organization's abstract social interests" is inadequate to establish standing.
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (considering standing in housing
discrimination case).
The view of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the issue of organizational
standing also is clear: "Ordinary expenditures as part of an organization's purpose do not
constitute the necessary injury-in-fact required for standing." Plotkin v. Ryan, 239 F.3d 882, 886
(7th Cir. 2001). See also Florida State Conference v. NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1166
(11th Cir. 2008) (Plaintiffs cannot bootstrap the cost of detecting and challenging illegal
practices into injury for standing purposes." ); Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington,
Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (rejecting argument that
"an organization devoted exclusively to advancing more rigorous enforcement of selected laws
could secure standing simply by showing that one alleged illegality had 'deflected' it from pursuit
of another").
Here, Wisconsin Carry lacks standing in its own right that would provide a jurisdictional
basis for this action. Wisconsin Carry lacks representative standing derivative through its
members, who do not have individual standing. Wisconsin Carry also lacks organizational
standing because the defendants have caused no discrete and particularized injury to Wisconsin
Carry's protectable legal interests.
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 13 of 1514
V. CONCLUSION.
The plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because none of
the plaintiffs have standing to sue. The plaintiffs seek an abstract advisory opinion, devoid of
factual context, in contravention of the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the
United States Constitution.
DATED: December 15, 2010.
BOARDMAN, SUHR, CURRY & FIELD LLP
By
/s/ Richard L. Bolton
Claude J. Covelli, #1014833
Catherine M. Rottier, #1016342
Richard L. Bolton, #1012552
Attorneys for Defendants City of Madison,
Wisconsin and Noble Wray, in his Official
Capacity as Police Chief of the City of Madison
U.S. Bank Building, Suite 410
1 South Pinckney Street
P.O. Box 927
Madison, Wisconsin 53701-0927
Telephone: (608) 257-9521
ccovelli@boardmanlawfirm.com
crottier@boardmanlawfirm.com
rbolton@boardmanlawfirm.com
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 14 of 1515
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of December, 2010, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of
such filing to the following e-mail addresses:
jtroupis@troupislawoffice.com
john.monroe1@earthlink.net
/s/ Richard L. Bolton
Richard L. Bolton, #1012552
Attorneys for Defendants City of Madison,
Wisconsin and Noble Wray, in his Official
Capacity as Police Chief of the City of Madison
U.S. Bank Building, Suite 410
1 South Pinckney Street
P.O. Box 927
Madison, Wisconsin 53701-0927
Telephone: (608) 257-9521
rbolton@boardmanlawfirm.com
F:\DOCS\WD\25981\229\A1098481.DOCX
Case: 3:10-cv-00548-bbc Document #: 11 Filed: 12/15/10 Page 15 of 15
