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Title 18 U.S.C. §922(q) School Zones

sudden valley gunner

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Plummer and several other supreme court decisions have decidedly shown we have the right to resist an arrest. It needs to be a re-educating going on, if a cop knew he could loose his life for false arrest he would be way more careful that he has the right guy and the guy has done a real crime.
 

Aaron1124

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The exemptions that include Law Enforcement personnel should include them on AND off duty, considering they always have the same authority, regardless of if they are being paid or not.
 

Bill Starks

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Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Amend the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=51344

To the Congress of the United States: Today I am transmitting for your immediate consideration and passage the "Gun-Free School Zones Amendments Act of 1995." This Act will provide the jurisdictional element for the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 required by the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Lopez held that the Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause by enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, codified at 18 U.S.C. 922(q). The Court found that this Act did not contain the jurisdictional element that would ensure that the firearms possession in question has the requisite nexus with interstate commerce.
In the wake of that decision, I directed Attorney General Reno to present to me an analysis of Lopez and to recommend a legislative solution to the problem identified by that decision. Her legislative recommendation is presented in this proposal.
The legislative proposal would amend the Gun-Free School Zones Act by adding the requirement that the Government prove that the firearm has "moved in or the possession of such firearm otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce."
The addition of this jurisdictional element would limit the Act's "reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce," as the Court stated in Lopez, and thereby bring it within the Congress' Commerce Clause authority.
The Attorney General reported to me that this proposal would have little, if any, impact on the ability of prosecutors to charge this offense, for the vast majority of firearms have "moved in . . . commerce" before reaching their eventual possessor.
Furthermore, by also including the possibility of proving the offense by showing that the possession of the firearm "otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce," this proposal would leave open the possibility of showing, under the facts of a particular case, that although the firearm itself may not have "moved in . . . interstate or foreign commerce," its possession nonetheless has a sufficient nexus to commerce.
The Attorney General has advised that this proposal does not require the Government to prove that a defendant had knowledge that the firearm " has moved in or the possession of such firearm otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce." The defendant must know only that he or she possesses the firearm.
I am committed to doing everything in my power to make schools places where young people can be secure, where they can learn, and where parents can be confident that discipline is enforced.
I pledge that the Administration will do our part to help make our schools safe and the neighborhoods around them safe. We are prepared to work immediately with the Congress to enact this legislation. I urge the prompt and favorable consideration of this legislative proposal by the Congress.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
The White House,
May 10, 1995.
 

amlevin

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Does this mean that not be prosecuted under Federal Statute if the firearm they are carrying was made within the State where it was being carried and "didn't move in Interstate Commerce"?
 

dwordinger

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Well to be fair, I am sure that some of the materials used to build the school may have, at one point, gone through interstate commerce.

It is obvious that the framers had just this type of law in mind when they gave congress the power to "...regulate commerce among the states...."

Anyone can see that this law is "necessary and proper" to prevent interstate trade wars.
No, the framers had just the opposite view in mind. The Commerce clause was to prevent restraints on trade, not to impose restraints.

From Gonzales V. Raich, et al.: The Supremes Get It Wrong, Again by D. T. Armentano (http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/armentano6.html)
There are many problems with the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens. The most obvious is the continued acceptance of the logic of WICKARD. As Justice Thomas argues in his brilliant dissent, if growing 6 marijuana plants on your own property for your own consumption is "economic activity" that can "affect" interstate commerce, then there is absolutely nothing under the economic sun (including pot luck dinners) that cannot be regulated by the federal congress. But, clearly, that was not the intent of the framers of the Constitution.

But even more fundamentally, the Commerce Clause itself was never meant by the Founders to be a blank check for "command and control" economic regulation. Indeed, the economic purpose of Article one Section 8 was almost precisely the opposite of the conventional explanation accepted by the majority in this case.

The original intent of the Commerce Clause was to make "normal" or "regular" commerce between the states; thus it was designed to promote trade and exchange not restrict it. Further, it was specifically aimed at preventing the states from enacting impediments to the free flow of "commerce" such as tariffs, quotas and taxes. And since the explicit language of the CSA, like all economic regulation, interferes with the free flow of commerce, it is inherently antithetical to the original intent of the Commerce Clause.

From 4 Health Care Questions and Answers by Andrew P. Napolitano (http://www.lewrockwell.com/napolitano/napolitano16.1.html)
1. Can the federal government compel a person to have health insurance? Congress may regulate interstate commerce, pursuant to power granted to it in the Constitution. The original grant of this power meant “to keep commerce regular,” that is, to assure that the states do not interfere with commerce by imposing tariffs on the movement of out-of-state goods into their states. Over the years, the Congress has pushed the envelope and regulated more than just commerce; it has regulated the salaries and working conditions and costs of those who manufacture goods that move in interstate commerce. The courts, as well, over the years have gone along with this. But the Congress has never compelled individuals to engage in interstate commerce by forcing them to purchase anything. My view is that this is unconstitutional, as well beyond the power given to Congress.

From The Trouble With the '64 Civil Rights Act by Congressman Ron Paul, who knows more about the Constitution than any other 534 congresscritters combined (http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul188.html)
This expansion of federal power was based on an erroneous interpretation of the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. The framers of the Constitution intended the interstate commerce clause to create a free trade zone among the states, not to give the federal government regulatory power over every business that has any connection with interstate commerce.

From Interstate Baseball? by Gary Galles (http://mises.org/mobile/daily.aspx?Id=850)
For a century, the commerce clause was solely used to overturn state restrictions on interstate commerce as unconstitutional. But with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, it began to be used to support active congressional regulation of commerce. Since then, the original commerce clause has been further undermined, with a near death blow coming in Wickard v. Filburn in 1942.

Justice Robert Jackson's opinion in that case mushroomed the scope of the commerce clause to extend federal power to regulate interstate commerce to the power to ban (not regulate) production (not commerce) occurring in a single state. Anything found to have a substantial effect--i.e., any business practice whatsoever--became fair game for federal regulators. The results we see in the acronyms of federal agencies all around us.

As long as the Supreme Court upholds and extends commerce clause precedents such as Wickard v. Filburn, there is hardly any limit to the federal regulation of business beyond the need for a congressional majority (which Federalist No. 10 assures us is inconsistent with our founders' vision). Any restraining power it once exercised over the federal government will be effectively erased from the Constitution.

Government by Commerce Clause by William J. Watkins Jr. (http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2936)
Are there any limits to the federal government’s power to regulate commerce? U.S. District Judge Henry Hudson has promised a decision on this issue before the end of this year. Judge Hudson is presiding over the Commonwealth of Virginia’s challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (better known as Obamacare), which forces Americans to buy health insurance or pay a fine.

Congress claimed authority to pass this legislation under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause. Pursuant to this enumerated power, Congress may “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” When the Constitution was drafted, commerce was understood, as explained in Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed., 1765), as “intercourse, exchange of one thing for another, interchange of anything; trade; traffick.”

The purpose of the Commerce Clause was to establish a free-trade zone within the United States by removing internal trade barriers—to promote the unhindered traffic and exchange of manufactured items and foodstuffs.

Prior to the Constitution, some states taxed goods that were simply passing through on their way to another state. Such taxes raised the price of goods and discouraged trade. By granting Congress a commerce power, the framers sought to destroy these internal trade barriers. In the words of Alexander Hamilton, an “unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions.”

So what does mandating the purchase of health insurance have to do with items freely traveling across states lines? Nothing. Then how can Congress claim that the law establishing Obamacare is a regulation of interstate commerce?

Unfortunately, over the past 70 years, the Commerce Clause has been stretched beyond recognition. For example, in 1938 Congress passed and President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Agriculture Adjustment Act. Under this statute, the federal government sought to prop up wheat prices by limiting the amount of wheat grown in the United States. An Ohio farmer, Roscoe Filburn, in a case known as Wickard v. Filburn, challenged the law as exceeding Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce. Filburn argued that his wheat was intended solely for use on his farm, to feed his chickens, and thus the statute should not apply to him.

In 1942, the Supreme Court ruled against Filburn, however. A local activity, the Court explained, can “be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” Although the 11.9 acres of wheat in question did not seem to affect interstate commerce, the Court reasoned that Filburn’s wheat, “taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.” Because growing wheat for home consumption by hundreds of farmers could influence the demand and price of wheat, the Court reasoned, the activities of one Ohio farmer could be reached by Congress’ power to regulate commerce.

Since upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Court has redefined interstate commerce as “economic activity.” If an activity substantially affects (or potentially could affect) the national market, then Congress may regulate the activity via the Commerce Clause. Because almost any activity conceivably could have some effect on the economy, Congress has used the Commerce Clause to pass laws dealing with everything from crime to civil rights.

If Congress and the president can force Americans to buy health insurance, is any activity beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause? If the auto industry needs assistance, what is to stop Congress from requiring that all multi-car families own at least one Chrysler or General Motors product? Rather than bail out the banks, Congress could simply require citizens to increase their bank deposits or face a penalty. The possibilities are endless.

Modern federal power looks nothing like the system of “few and defined” powers described by James Madison in Federalist No. 45. Nonetheless, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is a very new creature. By claiming the power to force citizens to purchase health insurance, President Obama and Congress seek to remove the remaining boundaries on federal power.

In 1942, the courts aided and abetted FDR’s expansion of the commerce power by upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Let’s hope that Judge Hudson, unlike his predecessors, shows the courage to oppose the unlimited power claimed by our current leaders.
 

Bill Starks

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I thought it was added after the Lopez case.

I stand corrected....

In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Lopez held that the Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause by enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, codified at 18 U.S.C. 922(q). The Court found that this Act did not contain the jurisdictional element that would ensure that the firearms possession in question has the requisite nexus with interstate commerce.
In the wake of that decision, I directed Attorney General Reno to present to me an analysis of Lopez and to recommend a legislative solution to the problem identified by that decision. Her legislative recommendation is presented in this proposal.
The legislative proposal would amend the Gun-Free School Zones Act by adding the requirement that the Government prove that the firearm has "moved in or the possession of such firearm otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce."
The addition of this jurisdictional element would limit the Act's "reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce," as the Court stated in Lopez, and thereby bring it within the Congress' Commerce Clause authority.
 

END_THE_FED

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Does this mean that not be prosecuted under Federal Statute if the firearm they are carrying was made within the State where it was being carried and "didn't move in Interstate Commerce"?




Unfortunately not.
At least not under the current standard.
The court has ruled that the item in question just has to have an effect on interstate commerce.

Gonzales v. Raich

Wickard v. Filburn


If anyone is interested, treat yourself to a read of Justice Thomas' eloquent dissent in the Gonzales v. Reich case.



EDIT: Quoted wrong post.
 
Last edited:

amlevin

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Unfortunately not.
At least not under the current standard.
The court has ruled that the item in question just has to have an effect on interstate commerce.

Gonzales v. Raich

Wickard v. Filburn


If anyone is interested, treat yourself to a read of Justice Thomas' eloquent dissent in the Gonzales v. Reich case.



EDIT: Quoted wrong post.

This will probably be the end result of all the "10th Amendment" Legislation that has been a topic of late. States will claim that a firearm manufactured and sold within a State is not subject to Federal Regulation. The "Fed's" will counter with "it has an effect on interstate commerce". I seriously doubt that the Fed's will roll over on this.
 
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