That's correct, the tricky part is law enforcement isn't obligated to disclose their RAS to you because it may Impede the crime they are investigating.
For instance if a bank was robbed in an area you were walking through you most certainly will be detained but LEO isn't going to feel the need to explain why.
That's a new one on me. If asked he better be able to articulate his reason for the stop. You need to read all of "Terry" and all the associated cases.
In the first place, if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in his presence. That right must be more than the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away; he certainly need not submit to a frisk for the questioner's protection. I would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime.
Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence. Just as a full search incident to a lawful arrest requires no additional justification, a limited frisk incident to a lawful stop must often be rapid and routine. There is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.
Also name only.......
When any of us are carrying concealed we understand that we must inform an officer of our conceal carry status and also have identification on our persons and supply that identification if requested.
When open carrying we are not required to have any type of identification on our persons. Knowing that the Ohio legislature passed ORC 2921.29.
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a law enforcement officer has wide leeway during an investigatory stop. But, that wide leeway is not unlimited. A stop under Terry is limited by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and also limited by Article 1 Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. ORC §2921.29 is unconstitutional as written. ORC §2921.29(A) states in part “No person who is in a public place shall refuse to disclose the person’s name, address, or date of birth, when requested by a law enforcement officer who reasonably suspects either of the following:...” ORC §2921.29 goes well beyond the holding of Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, et al, 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
The U.S. Supreme Court in Hiibel stated that:
Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, the Court has recognized that an officer's reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself during a Terry stop, see, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 229, it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer, see Brown, supra, at 53, n. 3. The Court is now of the view that Terry principles permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. Terry, supra, at 34.
The Hiibel court made it abundantly clear that, until Hiibel, an open question existed as to whether a suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for the refusal to answer questions, ie a suspect exercising their Fifth Amendment right. Through Hiibel the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Terry principles permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. The Court did not extend that principle beyond the giving of the suspect's name.
ORC §2921.29 states “no person...shall refuse to disclose the person’s name, address, or date of birth.” The term “or” in Websters dictionary is a conjunction introducing an alternative. Thus, in plain English ORC §2921.29 allows a person to give one of the three alternatives. But, what if an arresting officer charges an Accused with not supplying all three because the officer treated the term “or” as if it meant “and.” According to ORC §1.02(F) (“And” may be read “or,” and “or” may be read “and” if the sense requires it.) the officer is permitted to make such interpretation. The officer's interpretation, however, would be in direct violation of ORC §1.42 which states in part “Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Accordingly, the application of term “and” in ORC §2921.29(A) would then be in direct violation of Hiibel. Clearly, ORC §2921.29(A), when applied with the term “and” instead of “or”, would be beyond what the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed under the Fourth Amendment and therefore, ORC §2921.29 would be unconstitutional.
If an Accused gave their name, but was arrested and jailed for not giving his address and date of birth, the arrest and jailing would be under the color of law and in violation of the Accused's constitutional right under the U.S. and Ohio Constitution.
