No, I do not live in Montgomery County.
The Court did not address address.
Moving on.
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I stand corrected. You now make your residence in Greene county and your place of work at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base is in both Greene and Montgomery county. But, the fact is the Second District Court of Appeals covers Champaign, Clark, Darke, Greene, Miami and Montgomery counties.
And no we are not moving on. Here again, you either have a reading comprehension problem, or you did not read Hiibel.
Hiibel does, in fact, address stop and identify statutes, e.g., the permitting of an officer to stop a person reasonably suspected of committing a crime and “demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going” found such statutes void for vagueness. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352 (1983).
Further, the Court held that as applied to Hiibel’s case the stop and identify statute did not violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments. The Court’s decision in Terry v Ohio “recognized that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further.” A Terry stop must be “justified at its inception, and . . . reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” The Court said “our decisions make clear that questions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops” and “serves important government interests:” whether the person stopped has outstanding warrants, “a record of violence or mental disorder.” The Court also held that requiring Hiibel to identify himself does not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because “refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it “would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” him. As best we can tell, petitioner refused to identify himself only because he thought his name was none of the officer’s business.”
In other words, having to give your name under the Fourth Amendment is not absolute, e.g., if it would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute then the Fourth Amendment exception would not apply.
As to the video that Motofixxer posted, it is a clear example of the officer understanding the differences between First and Fifth Amendments.
The fifth amendment provides protection against compelled disclosure of certain information. Under the fifth amendment an individual cannot be compelled to give information which he reasonably believes may be used against him in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Leflcowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Unlike the first amendment protection not to speak, the fifth amendment right not to speak does not bar compelled testimony if the individual is given immunity. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
The first amendment protects against compelled expression or association of any sort so long as it is not outweighed by a countervailing government interest. Moreover, first amendment protection against compelled expression is provided not simply as a means of avoiding a chilling effect on the exercise of the rights to speak and associate, but rather to protect against government invasion of the "sphere of intellect and spirit." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
In other words, the open carrying of your firearm is an exercising of your first amendment right to free speech. Verbalizing the reasons for exercising your first amendment rights is not required, e.g., exercising your right not to speak.
Though contrary to the facts and the opinion of the court, eye95 is free to live in whatever fantasy world he chooses.