This sounds like one of those cases where the jurors were instructed to find a verdict in accordance with a particular wording of a particular law, not do something that makes sense.
Does the accused have a lawyer who doesn't care about the 2nd amendment, but just likes to win through whatever legal means available? A shyster usually operates better in our "justice"
system, rather than somebody who cares about right and wrong. I know, I've lost in court. Silly me, I thought it was supposed to make sense. I know better now. Money is the best tool for influencing the outcome of a trial.
One of my pet peeves is the "model jury instructions", which, to my mind, are designed to confuse juries, not educate them. They don't explain what the law is, they just lay a bunch of legal jargon on the jury with technical words (the trick about "legalese" is that it looks just like English, but the words mean something other than what you'd think). I offered one instruction, which was refused because it's not a "model" instruction, saying that a person has a right to be armed and that the jury cannot infer from the mere fact that he had a gun that he is guilty of the crime or of any of its elements. I think that, in this case, had that instruction been given, the outcome might have been different.
I like to think that I am not in the category of lawyers the second paragraph castigates.
There are a number of problems with the brandishing statute, but the two biggest have been created by appellate court decisions. First, the term, "brandish", has been defined by a dictionary definition rather than by an existing canon of judicial construction which says that a list of descriptive words has to be taken as meaning about the same thing, so that each of the terms in the phrase, "point, hold, or brandish", have to be taken as pretty much synonymous. So, as I read the language of the statute, those terms all means something like, "to aim", or "to allow the muzzle to go a certain way"; "hold", thus, does not mean merely to have the gun in one's hand, and "brandish" does not mean "to display in a shameful or ostentatious manner". Which leads me to my second issue: the crux of the violation is the phrase, "in such manner". The defendant has to have held, pointed, or brandished a firearm in a certain way, such that a reasonable person would have been placed in fear of his life. I read that to say that the defendant has to have done a specific act "in such manner", regardless of whether a witness actually had fear or apprehension. This tracks the judicial history of the parallel crime of assault. If a reasonable person standing in the shoes of that witness would have believed that he was about to be shot, then there's a violation.
In this case, the Commonwealth's evidence was that the Defendant seated in the driver's side of his car held the handgun pointed in a safe direction (up) for about three seconds as he inserted a magazine, and the driver of the vehicle behind him at a stop light saw that happen and "did not know what he might do next." That driver said that he "felt" the Defendant "glare at him" via the rearview mirror, although the Defendant was wearing sunglasses. He said that the Defendant "mouthed the word, 'okay." And, of course, he "felt fear". In other words, the driver thought that the Defendant, who was in possession of a firearm, might have subsequently have pointed, held, or brandished the firearm in such manner as to put him in fear of bodily injury, but that never actually happened. The Defendant, having held the gun up, holstered the gun in a compartment in the dash. So the Defendant in this case has been convicted for what the driver thought might have happened subsequently, but which never did, in fact, happen.