gluegun
Regular Member
imported post
I'm convinced using permit fees to increase General Fund is unlawful.
I found a US Supreme Court case from 1937 that involves states burdening interstate commerce (a recognized right) by charging fees. While the Supreme Court had previously decided that charging a fee to defray the cost of providing a service within it's constitutional power (roads), they determined in this case that contributing to any other expense (general fund) is an unconstitutional burden.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/300/290.html
Selected quotes:
The challenged statute defines 'caravaning' as the transportation, 'from without the State of any motor vehicle operated on its own wheels, or in tow of another motor vehicle, for the purpose of selling or offering the same for sale * * * to any purchaser' located within or without the state. Sections 2 and 3 prohibit caravaning without attaching to each vehicle so transported a special permit issued by the State Motor Vehicle Department, for which a fee of $15 is exacted... Section 6 directs that the fees collected be paid into the general fund in the state treasury, and declares that they are 'intended to reimburse the State treasury for the added expense which the State may incur in the administration and enforcement of this act and the added expense of policing the highways over which such caravaning may be conducted, so as to provide for [size="-1"] 298 U.S. 407 , recently before this Court, the Caravaning Act of New Mexico, containing some features similar to the present act, was likewise assailed as burdening interstate commerce by the imposition of a fee, of $7.50 for each vehicle moving by its own power, and $5 for each vehicle towed by another when moving in caravan. The statute made the privilege of using the highway conditional upon payment of the fee. The fees collected were devoted in part to highway purposes. We held that the fees were a charge for the use of the highways, not shown by the taxpayer to be unreasonable, which the state might lawfully demand.235 U.S. 610, 624 ; Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 249 , 250, 231.
To justify the exaction by a state of a money payment burdening interstate commerce, it must affirmatively appear that it is demanded as reimbursement for the expense of providing facilities, or of enforcing regulations of the commerce which are within its constitutional power.277 U.S. 163, 169 , 170, 504, 62 A.L.R. 45; Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 186 , 381; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 ; Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 267 , 196. This may appear from the statute itself, Morf v. Bingaman, supra; Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 557 , 703, or from the use of the money collected, to defray such expense. Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169, 173 , 144; see Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 168 , 169; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm., 295 U.S. 285 , Compare Hendrick v. Maryland, Sprout v. South Bend, [size="-1"] 276 U.S. 245, 249 .
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Hence we must look to the statute itself to ascertain the purposes for which the permit fees are collected. On this point it is explicit. It declares (section 6) that they are intended to reimburse the state treasury for the added expense of administering the Caravan Act and policing the caravaning traffic. This negatives any inference of the purpose of the collection which might otherwise be drawn from the statute, and from its provision that the permit is prerequisite to the use of the highways. Compare Morf v. Bingaman, supra. It is true that this declaration is not an appropriation of the moneys collected [size="-1"] [300 U.S. 290 , 296] [/size] and it does not foreclose the use of the fund for highway maintenance, should the state elect to do so. But until such appropriation is made the statute itself states the legislative purpose, and precludes state officials from asserting that the fees are collected for any other.
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We cannot say that the evidence does not support the conclusion of the trial court that the cost of policing would be amply met by a license fee of one-third of the amount so charged. The administrative expense of issuing the permits appears not to have been included, but the testimony that that expense was about $5.00 per car does not bridge the arithmetical gap, and does not impeach the court's conclusion that the permit fee bears no reasonable relation to the total cost of regulation, to defray which it is collected. It rightly held that the licensing provisions of the statute impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
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I'm convinced using permit fees to increase General Fund is unlawful.
I found a US Supreme Court case from 1937 that involves states burdening interstate commerce (a recognized right) by charging fees. While the Supreme Court had previously decided that charging a fee to defray the cost of providing a service within it's constitutional power (roads), they determined in this case that contributing to any other expense (general fund) is an unconstitutional burden.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/300/290.html
Selected quotes:
The challenged statute defines 'caravaning' as the transportation, 'from without the State of any motor vehicle operated on its own wheels, or in tow of another motor vehicle, for the purpose of selling or offering the same for sale * * * to any purchaser' located within or without the state. Sections 2 and 3 prohibit caravaning without attaching to each vehicle so transported a special permit issued by the State Motor Vehicle Department, for which a fee of $15 is exacted... Section 6 directs that the fees collected be paid into the general fund in the state treasury, and declares that they are 'intended to reimburse the State treasury for the added expense which the State may incur in the administration and enforcement of this act and the added expense of policing the highways over which such caravaning may be conducted, so as to provide for [size="-1"] 298 U.S. 407 , recently before this Court, the Caravaning Act of New Mexico, containing some features similar to the present act, was likewise assailed as burdening interstate commerce by the imposition of a fee, of $7.50 for each vehicle moving by its own power, and $5 for each vehicle towed by another when moving in caravan. The statute made the privilege of using the highway conditional upon payment of the fee. The fees collected were devoted in part to highway purposes. We held that the fees were a charge for the use of the highways, not shown by the taxpayer to be unreasonable, which the state might lawfully demand.235 U.S. 610, 624 ; Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 249 , 250, 231.
To justify the exaction by a state of a money payment burdening interstate commerce, it must affirmatively appear that it is demanded as reimbursement for the expense of providing facilities, or of enforcing regulations of the commerce which are within its constitutional power.277 U.S. 163, 169 , 170, 504, 62 A.L.R. 45; Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 186 , 381; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 ; Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 267 , 196. This may appear from the statute itself, Morf v. Bingaman, supra; Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 557 , 703, or from the use of the money collected, to defray such expense. Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169, 173 , 144; see Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 168 , 169; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm., 295 U.S. 285 , Compare Hendrick v. Maryland, Sprout v. South Bend, [size="-1"] 276 U.S. 245, 249 .
...
Hence we must look to the statute itself to ascertain the purposes for which the permit fees are collected. On this point it is explicit. It declares (section 6) that they are intended to reimburse the state treasury for the added expense of administering the Caravan Act and policing the caravaning traffic. This negatives any inference of the purpose of the collection which might otherwise be drawn from the statute, and from its provision that the permit is prerequisite to the use of the highways. Compare Morf v. Bingaman, supra. It is true that this declaration is not an appropriation of the moneys collected [size="-1"] [300 U.S. 290 , 296] [/size] and it does not foreclose the use of the fund for highway maintenance, should the state elect to do so. But until such appropriation is made the statute itself states the legislative purpose, and precludes state officials from asserting that the fees are collected for any other.
...
We cannot say that the evidence does not support the conclusion of the trial court that the cost of policing would be amply met by a license fee of one-third of the amount so charged. The administrative expense of issuing the permits appears not to have been included, but the testimony that that expense was about $5.00 per car does not bridge the arithmetical gap, and does not impeach the court's conclusion that the permit fee bears no reasonable relation to the total cost of regulation, to defray which it is collected. It rightly held that the licensing provisions of the statute impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
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