imported post
bobernet wrote:
I've already said this elsewhere, so I'll just quote here. I'm disappointed. Scalia sold us down the river on all but the most minimal "right." I realize the realities of getting a majority opinion, and narrow rulings, etc. Never the less, he could have just been silent rather than totally demolishing the true purpose of the 2nd amendment - namely, the ability of "the people" to bear arms in defense of themselves and against a tyrannical government.
Well, you state that you understand the realities of narrow rulings, then proceed to complain about this being a narrow ruling.
In legal proceedings, there is what is known as the "scope of inquiry". This basically means the topic being handled.
Judges should not exceed the scope of the inquiry. In this case, the matter was whether a law preventing an
individual from having a
"ready" firearm in his
home was within the limitations of the Second Amendment to the Constitution.
The Court held that an
individual ("The People") has a specific right to
own, load, and have ready a firearm in his
home ("keep and bear arms").
That was the scope of the case at hand, and that was what was ruled on.
The Court did not address licensing, registration, carry, or any other issue, as that was not within the scope of inquiry.
However, if you read "between the lines" and, on some issues, the lines themselves, the Court did "open the door" to additional cases.
From the Majority Opinion:
JUSTICE BREYER chides us for leaving so many applications
of the right to keep and bear arms in doubt, and for
not providing extensive historical justification for those
regulations of the right that we describe as permissible.
See post, at 42–43. But since this case represents this
Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment,
one should not expect it to clarify the entire field,
any more than Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145
(1879), our first in-depth Free Exercise Clause case, left
that area in a state of utter certainty. And there will be
time enough to expound upon the historical justifications
for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those
exceptions come before us.
Also, the Court refrained from any ruling on registration and licensing, specifically because it was not in the scope:
Respondent conceded at oral argument that he does
not “have a problem with . . . licensing” and that the District’s
law is permissible so long as it is “not enforced in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 74–75.
We therefore assume that petitioners’ issuance of a license
will satisfy respondent’s prayer for relief and do not address
the licensing requirement.
The language of that statement makes me believe that Justice Scalia would personally liked to address that issue, and most like not in favor of licensing, but since it was not within the scope of inquiry, it was not the time and place to address it.