rapgood
Regular Member
and depending upon the intellectual honesty of any federal judge, you'll most likely hear the following upon your lawsuit dismissal or your conviction.
The right there specified is that of "bearing arms for a lawful purpose." This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress.
U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876)
Your quote from Cruikshank predates the decision in McDonald, which unambiguously states “Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008), we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, and we struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. The city of Chicago (City) and the village of Oak Park, a Chicago suburb, have laws that are similar to the District of Columbia's, but Chicago and Oak Park argue that their laws are constitutional because the Second Amendment has no application to the States. We have previously held that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights apply with full force to both the Federal Government and the States. Applying the standard that is well established in our case law, we hold that the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (U.S. 2010)(emphasis added).
“There is nothing about Cruikshank's contrary holding that warrants its retention. I agree with the Court that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to the States. I do so because the right to keep and bear arms is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as a privilege of American citizenship.” J. Scalia’s concurrence, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088 (U.S. 2010).
Cruikshank's analysis was based upon an interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities clause. Since Cruikshank was decided, the S.Ct. has discontinued analysis of the most of the Bill of Rights under the P&I clause and has, instead, analyzed the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states under the Due Process clause. Since McDonald, Cruikshank has been abrogated once and overruled twice.
Even so, the S. Ct. held, “It is important to keep in mind that Heller, while striking down a law that prohibited the possession of handguns in the home, recognized that the right to keep and bear arms is not ‘a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.’ 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 678. We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.’ Id., at ___-___, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 678. We repeat those assurances here. Despite municipal respondents' doomsday proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (U.S. 2010)