Grant County District Court

[gogodawgs]

While checking a firearm at a courthouse for administrative purposes.

"I do not consent to any searches"

 

[Vitaeus]

Citation directly relating to firearm serial numbers:

"[2] The petitioner further argues that the taking of the serial numbers was not a seizure. The facts cannot support this conclusion. The serial numbers were not within the plain view of the officers, and their being obtained by the tilting of the Sony television constituted a warrantless seizure of those numbers.

United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1973), supports our holding that the taking of the serial numbers constituted a seizure. In that case Kentucky law enforcement officers had reliable information that the operator of a grocery store was selling beer without a license. The officers properly obtained a search warrant which directed the seizure of "any intoxicating liquors, apparatus for manufacturing intoxicating liquors or materials used in the manufacture of intoxicating liquors." In searching the store premises for the specific items described in the warrant, one of the officers noticed two rifles leaning against a wall in an upstairs closet, and removed the rifles from the closet and took them to the store area where he copied down the serial numbers of the weapons. The serial numbers were later checked, and it was discovered that the firearms had been stolen. A second search warrant was later procured upon which the officers returned and seized the two rifles. After holding that the seizure of the rifles was not justified under the plain view doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals of the 6th Circuit stated as follows on page 356:

The government argues that Trooper Brodt's actions were not a search or a seizure. Whether or not the officer's actions constituted a technical search, they clearly were a seizure. Officer Brodt, to be sure, could not

536 STATE v. MURRAY [Nov. 1974
84 Wn.2d 527, 527 P.2d 1303

help noticing the rifles in the closet as he had every right to do. But he did not simply see or observe the presence of the rifles (which as we have indicated were not contraband nor recognized by the officer to be such). Instead he removed them from the closet, carried them to the lower floor of the building and then copied down the serial numbers. The fact that he did not take the rifles with him after conducting the search does not make his actions any less a seizure. Removing the rifles from the closet was a seizure as was the copying down of the serial numbers. See United States v. Sokolow, 450 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1971). (Footnote omitted. Italics ours.) "

The mere access to the firearm serial numbers, ABSENT other evidence of criminal activity, in Washington state does not allow actionable fishing by law enforcement. Please find me an opposite finding that is a newer precedent. That the firearm is administratively in the possession of the LEO does not in WA allow "fishing" investigating or any other action. CAN a LEO run a number, certainly, is it legal, that I argue is a no, based on this precedent.

BTW this quote is from the case that I have been linking, which makes me wonder what exactly others are basing their opinions on.

 

[PALO]

Citation directly relating to firearm serial numbers:

"[2] The petitioner further argues that the taking of the serial numbers was not a seizure. The facts cannot support this conclusion. The serial numbers were not within the plain view of the officers, and their being obtained by the tilting of the Sony television constituted a warrantless seizure of those numbers.

United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1973), supports our holding that the taking of the serial numbers constituted a seizure. In that case Kentucky law enforcement officers had reliable information that the operator of a grocery store was selling beer without a license. The officers properly obtained a search warrant which directed the seizure of "any intoxicating liquors, apparatus for manufacturing intoxicating liquors or materials used in the manufacture of intoxicating liquors." In searching the store premises for the specific items described in the warrant, one of the officers noticed two rifles leaning against a wall in an upstairs closet, and removed the rifles from the closet and took them to the store area where he copied down the serial numbers of the weapons. The serial numbers were later checked, and it was discovered that the firearms had been stolen. A second search warrant was later procured upon which the officers returned and seized the two rifles. After holding that the seizure of the rifles was not justified under the plain view doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals of the 6th Circuit stated as follows on page 356:

The government argues that Trooper Brodt's actions were not a search or a seizure. Whether or not the officer's actions constituted a technical search, they clearly were a seizure. Officer Brodt, to be sure, could not

536 STATE v. MURRAY [Nov. 1974
84 Wn.2d 527, 527 P.2d 1303

help noticing the rifles in the closet as he had every right to do. But he did not simply see or observe the presence of the rifles (which as we have indicated were not contraband nor recognized by the officer to be such). Instead he removed them from the closet, carried them to the lower floor of the building and then copied down the serial numbers. The fact that he did not take the rifles with him after conducting the search does not make his actions any less a seizure. Removing the rifles from the closet was a seizure as was the copying down of the serial numbers. See United States v. Sokolow, 450 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1971). (Footnote omitted. Italics ours.) "

The mere access to the firearm serial numbers, ABSENT other evidence of criminal activity, in Washington state does not allow actionable fishing by law enforcement. Please find me an opposite finding that is a newer precedent. That the firearm is administratively in the possession of the LEO does not in WA allow "fishing" investigating or any other action. CAN a LEO run a number, certainly, is it legal, that I argue is a no, based on this precedent.

BTW this quote is from the case that I have been linking, which makes me wonder what exactly others are basing their opinions on.

yet again, the fact pattern is COMPLETELY different.

again, in THE CASE IN THIS THREAD, the gun was already in admin police custody. in the case you cite here, the cop decided on a whim to take the guns to do the check

again, an entirely different fact pattern

and again, change the fact pattern and you often change the conclusion

i will repeat yet again: based on the facts as presented by the OP, i think no unlawful search was made

i 100 % agree with the above case. OF COURSE taking the rifles was a seizure. i mean... DUH

the facts in the OP's case are substantially different

we can't "curve fit" here. iow, if you think this search SHOULD be illegal, then you will naturally curve fit to try to fit other cases to match. we ALL do this, btw. i see it in stock and futures trading too

but again, there are distinguishable facts.

again, you have to accept that in the OP's case, a SUBSTANTIALLY IMPORTANT FACT: THE GUN WAS ALREADY IN THE CUSTODY OF POLICE FOR ADMIN PURPOSES.

the QUESTION is, did the cop removing the gun from the holster AFTER HE LAWFULLY POSSESSED it constitute an unlawful search. there are a host of factors to consider. i considered them. i came to a conclusion./ it's speculation. i may be wrong. a court might rule 5-4 my way, 9-0 against my way, or unanimously as i believe

like i said, i've probably read several hundred search and seizure cases, most being WA specific. what i do is synthesize what i learned from them, and try to apply as best i can the principles

i note also, that in favor of the search being bad, WA law (relatively uniquely amongst states) often does consider subjective intent of officers, in ADDITION to "objective reasonableness". that's why Ladson was decided the way it was (the case that outlawed "pretext stops")

cheers

 

[PALO]

While checking a firearm at a courthouse for administrative purposes.

"I do not consent to any searches"

fwiw, i have opined that making such a statement may in fact change the conclusion. i'm not convinced it's dispositive, but it's definitely relevant imo

that's because the statement made evidences the person's EXPECTATION of privacy.

 

[Vitaeus]

I agree to disagree, I am done. Your stance that the private citizen must positively affirm a right is not going to change. That this is the exact opposite of a constitutional stance is enough for me. I even list a specific example from our WA Supreme Court which specifically states that recording or running a serial number absent any criminal evidence isn't lawful. I am done unless someone can provide an actual citation that is a rebuttal of the provided citation.