Applying these principles, as a matter of state law appellants throughout the strike had a lawful interest in their living quarters sufficient to entitle them to exclude others. Appellants' interest, moreover, reasonably entitled them to a legitimate expectation of privacy protected by the Third Amendment. Appellants' rooms, which they furnished and for which they were charged a monthly rent, were their homes. They did not maintain separate residences or have alternative housing available in the event of an emergency. During the entire two-year period preceding the strike, appellants did not reside in any other dwelling. These factors supporting the existence of a tenancy-type interest are reinforced by the Department's Directive and Rules, which repeatedly refer to the occupants as tenants and at one place to Mid-Orange as the equivalent of a landlord....Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to appellants, we cannot rule out an inference that the Rules signed by both the Superintendent and appellants was tantamount to a lease.
On this record we cannot agree with the district court's finding that appellants' occupancy was more analogous to a possession incident to employment, which under New York law does not constitute a landlord-tenant relationship.....
We conclude, therefore, that in the context of a motion for summary judgment the record, viewed most favorably to appellants, does not preclude a finding that they had a substantial tenancy interest in their staff housing, and that they enjoyed significant privacy due to their right to exclude others from what were functionally their homes.... Accordingly, since we cannot say that as a matter of law appellants were not entitled to the protection of the Third Amendment, we reverse the summary dismissal of their Third Amendment claim.....
Pax...