Open carrying at the mall

[Metalhead47]

Quit arguing with yourself in the mirror then and you won't have that problem!

Another hint would be to legitimize most of your posts by using links to credible source material.

Computer monitors are not mirrors. No wonder you can't understand the aforementioned concepts, "hyperbole," "analogy," etc.

 

[LkWd_Don]

The right to life is absolute. You cannot make surrender of that right a condition to enter your property. Once again, my right to life does trump all of yours in any given situation, and the same is true for you and everyone else. Note that the goal of acting in defense of ones self or ones property is not to kill but rather to eliminate or neutralize the threat.

A business would sound pretty silly if they said "all patrons on the premises maybe subject to random execution at our discretion" wouldn't they? By denying patrons the typical tools for self defense, that is in practice what they are doing. Since the ones who actually mean to harm won't follow that in the first place.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

The right to life is absolute. You cannot make surrender of that right a condition to enter your property

Are you trying to put words in my posts that do not exist? If you were not, then I am left to conclude that you do not understand what you are reading.

Once again, my right to life does trump all of yours in any given situation,

So you are then saying that only you have rights, that no one else matters! Not! Every Human has the same Rights as you do! Those rights are as equal for them as they are for you, so your making such a statement as you just did, simply shows how irrational you are being.

Note that the goal of acting in defense of ones self or ones property is not to kill but rather to eliminate or neutralize the threat.

In our litigious society, any aggressor that your use of self-defense leaves alive, will most likely sue you! Even if the weapon of your choice to fend that attack off was a baseball bat.

All of my training has taught me that, if I feel that threatened that I must pull my firearm to protect myself, I am shooting center mass and if I see his hands or any other body part still moving in a threatening manner, I will most likely shoot again,especially if the attacker has a visible weapon. As to defend myself, I do not want any aggressor to continue to mount an attack against me. Or if I was protecting someone else, against them.

A business would sound pretty silly if they said "all patrons on the premises maybe subject to random execution at our discretion" wouldn't they?

Here again, I will have to ask that you show me where I or anyone else here has even implied that a property owner should do something so idiotic! You are simply inserting asinine comments now.

<facepalm>

It appears I'm in a battle of wits with an unarmed man. :banghead:

Go back and read everything I just posted. Very slowly if you must. While you're at it, you might want to familiarize yourself with concepts such as "hyperbole" and "analogy" since they seem to have gone right over your head.

Computer monitors are not mirrors. No wonder you can't understand the aforementioned concepts, "hyperbole," "analogy," etc.

I fully understand that hyperbole is exaggeration. As it seems you are making an allegation now, show me were I have exaggerated?

And if you were trying to say that you were exaggerating, I will agree. But again that puts you having a battle of wits with yourself, as I was not the one exaggerating.

Now let us look at your accusation of an analogy. Where is a statement like you made of

The right to life is absolute. You cannot make surrender of that right a condition to enter your property

a correct analogy to anything I had said when you are twisting it into something that was never said, except by you?

You should learn the meaning of words before you use them, especially if you are going to disparage others for your misuse of them.

Not only did I never make a condition of offering up a life for entry onto my propety, you and others have failed to comprehend that (If I must say this again)

A property owner has no obligation to provide advance notice. You're entering upon his/her property is an acceptance of his/her rules.

Or when I asked

I will turn this around on you and ask that you show me where there is no possible way that any property owner can have you arrested for bringing a firearm onto restricted property.

you failed to provide such proof, and when I said

I have no posted signs on my property, but if someone I do not know enters my property without my express invitation, and I see a strange bulge that I suspect is a concealed weapon, Do I have to wait before I shoot? Absolutely Not!

You have failed again to show where I am legally obligated to wait. I don't, If I feel the situation is dire enough that I should call 911, and I either do not feel that I have time to dial or shoot after I have dialed, before the LE can respond, I simply need to be able to articulate a few things that would be in my favor. And I have told others here that I am not about to do as so many here would, by bragging about what I might do.

Now, if you wish to have a battle of anything, please arm yourself with facts and accuracy before you even think about adding wits into the mix. You will lose everytime.

 

[LkWd_Don]

Citation, please?

RCW 9A.16.020
Use of force — When lawful.

The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:

(4) Whenever reasonably used by a person to detain someone who enters or remains unlawfully in a building or on real property lawfully in the possession of such person, so long as such detention is reasonable in duration and manner to investigate the reason for the detained person's presence on the premises, and so long as the premises in question did not reasonably appear to be intended to be open to members of the public ;

Since you are only looking at UoF, Do you not see that you gave your own answer!
Let me modify the emphasis for you.
And lets add to that, since you seemed to feel it necessary to redact the most important parts.

(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary;
and
6) Whenever used by any person to prevent a mentally ill, mentally incompetent, or mentally disabled person from committing an act dangerous to any person, or in enforcing necessary restraint for the protection or restoration to health of the person, during such period only as is necessary to obtain legal authority for the restraint or custody of the person. http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=9A.16.020

Now, let us look at

RCW 9A.16.050
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=9A.16.050
Homicide — By other person — When justifiable.

Homicide is also justifiable when committed either:

(1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished; or

(2) In the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon the slayer, in his or her presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is.

If the person turns out to be armed, I do not know or recognize them as having had a lawful duty on my property, I felt threatened, so sorry for them, Que Sera, Sera.

 

[darkside]

Just a few things to think on:

1. My right to life is more important to me than yours is because I dont know or care about you. I would expect the same out of any person walking the planet. Does that mean that I would not put myself in harms way to try and save a life? NO!

2. If, as you suggest, that you would not wait to shoot a person, uninvited on your property, with a strange bulge you suspect is a weapon, I hope you have an attorney ready to defend you. Because unless said person made threats of bodily harm, shooting them for just trespassing would not be a good thing. And if an openly carried weapon is not enough reason to be arrested in Washington(by law), a strange bulge is not enough for a justified shooting.

3. You can chose to respond to this or not, I dont care. You have been added to my ignore list so i wont see it.

 

[Metalhead47]

Just a few things to think on:

1. My right to life is more important to me than yours is because I dont know or care about you. I would expect the same out of any person walking the planet. Does that mean that I would not put myself in harms way to try and save a life? NO!

2. If, as you suggest, that you would not wait to shoot a person, uninvited on your property, with a strange bulge you suspect is a weapon, I hope you have an attorney ready to defend you. Because unless said person made threats of bodily harm, shooting them for just trespassing would not be a good thing. And if an openly carried weapon is not enough reason to be arrested in Washington(by law), a strange bulge is not enough for a justified shooting.

3. You can chose to respond to this or not, I dont care. You have been added to my ignore list so i wont see it.

See now this guy GETS IT. This guy has has some measure of English comprehension. THIS GUY understands abstract concepts.

...doesn't get it...

<double facepalm> Sigh, I swear it's like trying to have a meaningful discussion with a kindergartener at this point...:banghead:

 

[bmg50cal]

Some poor SOB with delirium might wonder onto LkWd_Don's property and get shot dead because they only had full colostomy bag. :uhoh:

 

[Trigger Dr]

Just a few things to think on:

3. You can chose to respond to this or not, I dont care. You have been added to my ignore list so i wont see it.

Since putting him on Ignore list, It has been very rewarding to read NOTHING from him

 

[BigDave]

Read and absorb if you can, basically one must in imminent fear of life or limb, use reasonable force, not more the necessary and only enough force as a reasonable person know what you knew at the time.
Don in your original post/scenario on this matter was basically, uninvited guest, bulge in clothing, shoot!, the laws in Washington State are not that limited and has specific requirements.

11 WAPRAC WPIC 16.02
WPIC 16.02 Justifiable Homicide—Defense of Self and Others

11 Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 16.02 (3d Ed)


Washington Practice Series TM
Database Updated November 2011

Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
2008 Edition Prepared by the Washington Supreme Court Committee On Jury Instructions, Hon. Sharon S. Armstrong, Co-Chair, Hon. William L. Downing, Co-Chair
​

Part IV. Defenses
WPIC CHAPTER 16. Justifiable Homicide

WPIC 16.02 Justifiable Homicide—Defense of Self and Others

It is a defense to a charge of [murder] [manslaughter] that the homicide was justifiable as defined in this instruction.
Homicide is justifiable when committed in the lawful defense of [the slayer] [the slayer's [husband] [wife] [registered domestic partner] [parent] [child] [brother] [sister]] [any person in the slayer's presence or company] when:
1) the slayer reasonably believed that the person slain [or others whom the defendant reasonably believed were acting in concert with the person slain] intended [to commit a felony] [to inflict death or great personal injury];
2) the slayer reasonably believed that there was imminent danger of such harm being accomplished; and
3) the slayer employed such force and means as a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar conditions as they reasonably appeared to the slayer, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances as they appeared to [him] [her], at the time of [and prior to] the incident.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not justifiable. If you find that the State has not proved the absence of this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

NOTE ON USE

Use this instruction in any homicide case in which this defense is an issue supported by the evidence. Use bracketed material as applicable.
Use WPIC 25.01, Homicide—Definition, with this instruction. Use WPIC 2.04.01, Great Personal Injury—Definition, and WPIC 2.09, Felony—Designation of, as applicable with this instruction. If there is an issue whether the defendant was the aggressor, use WPIC 16.04, Aggressor—Defense of Self and Others.
If resistance to a felony is involved, see WPIC 16.03, Justifiable Homicide—Resistance to Felony.
Do not use this instruction if the deadly force was used to defend against a non-violent felony, such as forgery, bribery, perjury, or the like.
When the offense charged is attempted murder, use this instruction, rather than WPIC 17.02, Lawful Force—Defense of Self, Others, Property.
If a case involves a registered domestic partnership, and if it becomes necessary to define the term for jurors, an instruction can be drafted using language from RCW Chapter 26.60.

COMMENT

Generally. The instruction is based upon RCW 9A.16.050(1).
All facts and circumstances. The instruction's third numbered paragraph, referring to all facts and circumstances, is based upon State v. Allery, 101 Wn.2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984). In Allery, the Supreme Court held that if there is evidence of self-defense, the jury must be instructed “to consider the conditions as they appeared to the slayer, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances known to the slayer at the time and prior to the incident.” State v. Allery, 101 Wn.2d at 595. Also see State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 804 P.2d 577 (1991); State v. Bell, 60 Wn.App. 561, 805 P.2d 815 (Div. 2 1991).
In a case involving allegations of ongoing abuse, the jury is to inquire whether the defendant acted reasonably, given the defendant's experience of abuse by the victim. State v. Janes, 121 Wn.2d 220, 239, 850 P.2d 495, 22 A.L.R.5th 921 (1993).
Burden of proof. The paragraph referring to the burden of proof is based upon State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983). In McCullum, the court held that the State has the burden of proving the absence of self-defense in a prosecution for first degree murder. McCullum continues to be cited with approval on this point. E.g., State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 10, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996). For a detailed discussion see the Introduction to Part IV—Defenses. In State v. Read, 147 Wn.2d 238, 53 P.3d 26 (2002), the court held that a defendant had a burden of producing “some evidence” to establish the killing occurred under circumstances where there was a defense of life and also to produce “some evidence” that he or she had a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm or imminent danger, before the defendant is deemed entitled to raise a self-defense claim. However, this must be read in conjunction with McCullum, where the court explained that there only needs to be some evidence admitted, from whatever source, which tends to prove the killing was done in self-defense. State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d at 487.
Withdrawal. As a general rule, one who is the aggressor or who provokes an altercation in which another is killed cannot invoke the right of self-defense to justify or excuse the homicide. However, the right of self-defense is revived as to the aggressor or the provoker if that person in good faith withdraws from the combat at such time and in such a manner as to clearly apprise the other person that he or she was desisting or intended to desist from further aggressive action. See State v. Craig, 82 Wn.2d 777, 514 P.2d 151 (1973); State v. Wilson, 26 Wn.2d 468, 174 P.2d 553 (1946). In State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 801 P.2d 193 (1990), the Washington Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly refused the defendant's proposed self-defense instruction in a prosecution for felony murder because the defendant did not drop his gun or surrender and did not “clearly manifest a good faith intention to withdraw from the burglary or remove the decedent's fear.” State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d at 618.
Felony murder. A claim of self-defense in felony murder prosecutions presents special problems for instructing the jury. In State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 801 P.2d 193 (1990), the Supreme Court held that because a defendant is strictly responsible for death caused while fleeing from first degree burglary, the trial court properly refused the defendant's proposed self-defense instruction because the burglary was still in progress at the time that the defendant was fleeing from scene. In State v. Bolar, 118 Wn.App. 490, 78 P.2d 1012 (Div. 1 2003), the court, discussing Dennison, seemed to hold that self-defense is not available as a matter of law when the felony murder is based on burglary. In State v. Ferguson, 131 Wn.App. 855, 129 P.3d 856 (Div. 2 2006), the Court of Appeals held that when the felony murder charge is predicated on assault, the defendant may claim self-defense but only if he reasonably feared death or great bodily harm. Thus, the Ferguson court concluded that only WPIC 16.02 can be given in a felony murder prosecution and that WPIC 17.02 can “never” be given. It appears that, in determining whether the jury should be instructed on self-defense, the court should carefully analyze the facts presented at trial and the elements of the predicate felony alleged.
Defense of others. A person has a right to use such force to defend another as the person may use in defending himself or herself. The right to resort to the use of force in defending another is to be judged by the facts and circumstances appearing to the defender at the time. Thus, an individual is justified in using force to defend another if that individual reasonably believes that the person to be protected is the innocent party and in danger, even if, in fact, the person being defended was the aggressor. See State v. Penn, 89 Wn.2d 63, 568 P.2d 797 (1977); State v. Fischer, 23 Wn.App. 756, 598 P.2d 742 (Div. 2 1979); State v. Bernardy, 25 Wn.App. 146, 605 P.2d 791 (Div. 1 1980).
RCW 9A.16.050(1) states in part that homicide is justifiable when committed “in the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company.” It has been held that under this statutory language, a homicide committed in the defense of another is not justifiable, unless the person being defended was present at the time of homicide. See State v. Trevino, 10 Wn.App. 89, 516 P.2d 779 (Div. 3 1973) (homicide allegedly in defense of the defendant's wife and children was not justifiable because neither the wife nor the children were present at the time of the shooting).
Imminent danger. The phrase “the slayer reasonably believed that” is included in the second numbered paragraph in light of the holding of the court in State v. LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d 896, 913 P.2d 369 (1996) (overruled on other grounds in State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 217 P.3d 756 (2009)) and State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 973 P.2d 1049 (1999), that the former version could be misunderstood to require actual imminent danger. See also WPIC 16.07, Justifiable Homicide—Actual Danger Not Necessary, and its Comment.


“Imminence does not require an actual physical assault. A threat, or its equivalent, can support self-defense when there is a reasonable belief that the threat will be carried out. Especially in abusive relationships, patterns of behavior become apparent which can signal the next abusive episode.”

State v. Janes, 121 Wn.2d at 241 (citations omitted). While “immediate harm” means “occurring, acting, or accomplished without loss of time: made or done at once,” “imminent harm” means “ready to take place: near at hand: … hanging threateningly over one's head.” In an abusive situation, “[t]hat the triggering behavior and the abusive episode are divided by time does not necessarily negate the reasonableness of the defendant's perception of imminent harm.” 121 Wn.2d at 241.
Multiple assailants. There is no requirement that the defendant's fear be caused by only the person slain. His self-defense is lawful if based on reasonable fear of imminent harm from either the person slain, or others whom the defendant also reasonably feared. State v. Harris, 122 Wn.App. 547, 90 P.3d 1133 (Div. 2 2004); State v. Irons, 101 Wn.App. 544, 550, 4 P.3d 174 (Div. 1 2000).
Great personal injury. When given in conjunction with this instruction in a case involving the use of force against an unarmed assailant, the definition of “great personal injury” must contain the subjective element, as set forth in WPIC 2.04.01, Great Personal Injury—Definition. State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d 469, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997). Practitioners should carefully note that “great personal injury” is distinct from “great bodily harm.” See the discussion of these terms in the Comment to WPIC 2.04.01. The term “great bodily harm” should not be used with this instruction. State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 475 n.3.
Attempted murder. This instruction, rather than WPIC 17.02, Lawful Force—Defense of Self, Others, Property, should be used when the charged offense is attempted murder. “[T]he important issue is the defendant's mental state in committing the crime, not whether the victim in fact died.” State v. Cowen, 87 Wn.App. 45, 53, 939 P.2d 1249 (Div. 1 1997).
Domestic partners. In 2009, the Legislature amended RCW Chapter 9A.16 to indicate that the chapter's references to spouses are to be interpreted as applying equally to state registered domestic partners. RCW 9A.16.900; Laws of 2009, Chapter 521, § 22 (effective December 3, 2009, based on voter approval of Referendum Measure 71). The pattern instruction has been updated accordingly.
Other. The statute states in part that the defense is applicable “when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony.” For purposes of the defense, the use of deadly force appears to be limited to the resistance of violent felonies that threaten human life or may result in great personal injury. See State v. Nyland, 47 Wn.2d 240, 287 P.2d 345 (1955) (adultery is not a crime that imperils the life of the unoffending spouse or threatens personal injury). No self-defense instruction should be given when deadly force is used to repel an unlawful trespass that does not amount to a felony, because such force is excessive as a matter of law. State v. Griffith, 91 Wn.2d 572, 589 P.2d 799 (1979).
For a discussion of non-violent felonies that would not justify the use of deadly force, see the Comment to WPIC 16.03, Justifiable Homicide—Resistance to Felony.
In State v. Hughes, 106 Wn.2d 176, 721 P.2d 902 (1986), the Washington Supreme Court refused to adopt the doctrine of “imperfect” self-defense. The court found that the trial court did not err in refusing an instruction that stated that “the use of force is not done with unlawful intent to kill where the person believes in good faith that he or she is acting in self-defense even though the person's belief is unreasonable.” State v. Hughes, 106 Wn.2d at 188. Also see State v. Bell, 60 Wn.App. 561, 805 P.2d 815 (Div. 2 1991). For cases relating to a defendant's reasonable belief as a justification for acting in self-defense, see the Comments to WPIC 16.04, Aggressor—Defense of Self and Others and WPIC 17.02, Lawful Force—Defense of Self and Others.
[Current as of February 1, 2010.]

Westlaw. © 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

11 WAPRAC WPIC 16.02

END OF DOCUMENT

11 WAPRAC WPIC 17.02
WPIC 17.02 Lawful Force—Defense of Self, Others, Property
11 Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 17.02 (3d Ed)Washington Practice Series TM
Database Updated November 2011
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 2008 Edition

Prepared by the Washington Supreme Court Committee On Jury Instructions, Hon. Sharon S. Armstrong, Co-Chair, Hon. William L. Downing, Co-Chair

​

Part IV. Defenses
WPIC CHAPTER 17. Lawful Force—Charges Other Than Homicide

WPIC 17.02 Lawful Force—Defense of Self, Others, Property

It is a defense to a charge of __________ that the force [used][attempted][offered to be used] was lawful as defined in this instruction.
[The [use of][attempt to use][offer to use] force upon or toward the person of another is lawful when [used][attempted][offered] [by a person who reasonably believes that [he][she] is about to be injured] [by someone lawfully aiding a person who [he][she] reasonably believes is about to be injured] in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against the person, and when the force is not more than is necessary.]
[The [use of][attempt to use][offer to use] force upon or toward the person of another is lawful when [used][attempted][offered] in preventing or attempting to prevent a malicious trespass or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in that person's possession, and when the force is not more than is necessary.]
The person [using][or][offering to use] the force may employ such force and means as a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar conditions as they appeared to the person, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time of [and prior to] the incident.
The [State][City][County] has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the force [used][attempted][offered to be used] by the defendant was not lawful. If you find that the [State][City][County] has not proved the absence of this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty [as to this charge].

NOTE ON USE

Use this instruction in any case in which this defense is an issue supported by the evidence.
Use bracketed material as applicable. Use this instruction for any charge other than homicide or attempted homicide. If homicide is involved, use WPIC 16.02, Justifiable Homicide—Defense of Self and Others.
With this instruction, use WPIC 16.05, Necessary—Definition. Also use, as applicable, WPIC 2.13, Malice—Maliciously—Definition. If there is an issue whether the defendant was the aggressor, use WPIC 16.04, Aggressor—Defense of Self, or WPIC 16.04.01, Aggressor—Defense of Others.

COMMENT

RCW 9A.16.020(3).
Generally. The wording of this instruction in the second edition “correctly instructed the jury on the subjective standard of self-defense.” State v. Goodrich, 72 Wn.App. 71, 77, 863 P.2d 599 (1993), partially abrogated on other grounds as noted in State v. Ramos, 124 Wn.App. 334, 101 P.3d 872 (2004).
The instruction has been amended for the 2008 edition to clarify for the jury that the defendant need not believe that the defendant or another is about to be injured in order to lawfully use force against a malicious interference with property. See State v. Bland, 128 Wn.App. 511, 116 P.3d 428, 430 (2005).
All facts and circumstances. The third paragraph, referring to all facts and circumstances, is based upon State v. Allery, 101 Wn.2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984). See Comment to WPIC 16.02.
Burden of proof. The paragraph referring to the burden of proof is based upon State v. Acosta, 101 Wn.2d 612, 683 P.2d 1069 (1984). In Acosta, the court held that the State has the burden of proving the absence of self-defense in prosecutions for assault. The court cited both a statutory and a constitutional basis for its holding. The court found that the Legislature intended that the State prove the absence of self-defense when it revised RCW 9A.16.020. The court also found that the burden of proving self-defense may not constitutionally be placed on the defendant if proof of self-defense tends to negate one or more elements of the crime charged. The court noted that placing the burden of proof on the defendant in such cases would relieve the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Failure to instruct the jury that the State has the burden of proving the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt was reversible error when there was sufficient evidence of self-defense to present the issue to the jury. State v. Redwine, 72 Wn.App. 625, 865 P.2d 552 (1994).
For a general discussion of the burden of proof on defenses, see Introduction to Part IV, Defenses.
Relationship to battered woman syndrome. The battered woman syndrome is not a defense in itself. The function of evidence of the battered woman syndrome is to assist the trier of fact in evaluating the defense of self-defense; i.e., in evaluating the reasonableness of both the use of force and the degree of force used by the defendant. Evidence of the battered woman syndrome, alone, is insufficient to submit the defense of self-defense to the jury. In order to submit the defense to the jury, the defendant must show that she perceived imminent danger, based on some threatening behavior or communication by the victim at the time of the incident in question. State v. Walker, 40 Wn.App. 658, 700 P.2d 1168 (1985).
See the discussion of State v. Janes, 121 Wn.2d 220, 239, 850 P.2d 495 (1993), in the Comment to WPIC 16.02, Justifiable Homicide—Defense of Self and Others.
Relationship with “no duty to retreat” rule. The pattern instruction tracks the statutory definition of when force is “not unlawful” as stated in RCW 9A.16.020(3), including its provision that the “force [used by the defendant] is not more than is necessary.”
The “necessary” force limitation included in both RCW 9A.16.020(3) and this instruction may seem in conflict with Washington's rule that there is no duty to retreat in certain cases. See discussion in State v. Williams, 81 Wn.App. 738, 916 P.2d 445 (1996). The statutory definition of “necessary” includes that “no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist.” RCW 9A.16.010(1). In a given case, a jury could interpret this language as precluding consideration of self-defense for a defendant who was resisting an attack in a place where he had a right to be, because he did not take an avenue of retreat. In such a case, the court may need to make clearer to the jury that the defendant was not obliged to retreat rather than defend. See State v. Williams, 81 Wn.App. at 744 (holding that “where a jury may conclude that flight is a reasonably effective alternative to the use of force in self-defense, the no duty to retreat instruction should be given.”). At the same time, the prosecutor should not be deprived of the argument that other alternatives to the use of force may have existed. In such a case, the court should use the “no duty to retreat” instruction of WPIC 17.05, using the second bracketed alternative, which explains in more detail the relationship of the “necessary force” limitation and the “no duty to retreat” rule.
Defense of property. Because the defendant was not in lawful possession of wildlife (coyotes), he could not invoke defense of property as a defense to assault. State v. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d 460, 470–71, 901 P.2d 286, 50 A.L.R.5th 921 (1995). A defendant may use necessary force against a malicious trespass or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in that person's possession even though the defendant does not reasonably believe that he is about to be injured. See State v. Bland, 128 Wn.App. 511, 116 P.3d 428, 430 (2005).
Accidental injury. When there is evidence that the defendant had a reasonable fear of the victim, intentionally pointed a gun at a victim, used a reasonable amount of force, and was not the aggressor, it is error to refuse to give a self-defense instruction. In such circumstances, a claim of self-defense is not inconsistent with a claim that the gun was fired accidentally. State v. Callahan, 87 Wn.App. 925, 943 P.2d 676 (1997).
Attempted homicide. When the charged offense is attempted murder, the appropriate instruction is WPIC 16.02, Justifiable Homicide—Defense of Self and Others, rather than WPIC 17.02. State v. Cowen, 87 Wn.App. 45, 53, 939 P.2d 1249 (1997).
Felony murder. A claim of self-defense in felony murder prosecutions presents special problems for instructing the jury. In State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 801 P.2d 193 (1990), the Supreme Court held that because a defendant is strictly responsible for death caused while fleeing from first degree burglary, the trial court properly refused the defendant's proposed self-defense instruction because the burglary was still in progress at time that the defendant was fleeing from scene. In State v. Bolar, 118 Wn.App. 490, 78 P.3d 1012 (2003), the court, discussing Dennison, seemed to hold that self-defense is not available as a matter of law when the felony murder is based on burglary. In State v. Ferguson, 131 Wn.App. 855, 129 P.3d 856 (2006), the Court of Appeals held that when the felony murder charge is predicated on assault, the defendant may claim self-defense but only if he reasonably feared death or great bodily harm. Thus, the Ferguson court concluded that only WPIC 16.02 can be given in a felony murder prosecution and that WPIC 17.02 can “never” be given. It appears that, in determining whether the jury should be instructed on self-defense, the court should carefully analyze the facts presented at trial and the elements of the predicate felony alleged.
Other statutes. RCW 9A.16.020(4) defines lawful force by a parent, guardian, or teacher. RCW 9A.16.100 defines lawful force by a passenger carrier in expelling a passenger. RCW 9A.16.020(6) defines lawful force in dealing with a mentally retarded or mentally ill person.
[Current as of July 2008.]

Westlaw. © 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

11 WAPRAC WPIC 17.02

 

[sudden valley gunner]

snip of jury instructions

Jury instructions are not law. What I wish is that they would advise the juries their right to nullify bad law.

 

[BigDave]

Jury instructions are not law. What I wish is that they would advise the juries their right to nullify bad law.

Take the time to look into the note on use and comments, as it cites where the jury instructions are applied and cites supporting them.

 

[Freedom1Man]

Jury instructions are not law. What I wish is that they would advise the juries their right to nullify bad law.

"Case law" is not law either. I wish more people realized that too.

 

[LkWd_Don]

Just a few things to think on:

1. My right to life is more important to me than yours is because I dont know or care about you. I would expect the same out of any person walking the planet. Does that mean that I would not put myself in harms way to try and save a life? NO!

2. If, as you suggest, that you would not wait to shoot a person, uninvited on your property, with a strange bulge you suspect is a weapon, I hope you have an attorney ready to defend you. Because unless said person made threats of bodily harm, shooting them for just trespassing would not be a good thing. And if an openly carried weapon is not enough reason to be arrested in Washington(by law), a strange bulge is not enough for a justified shooting.

3. You can chose to respond to this or not, I dont care. You have been added to my ignore list so i wont see it.

3) Fine then Darkside will not read it.

1) My rights are just as equal as anyone else's, yours included.

2) You make a lot of major assumptions that others here do as well. Never did I say that I would shoot simply because someone trespassed. You and everyone else should give that thought. You have no idea what my training might be. If I suspect a bulge is a concealed weapon, chances are it is a weapon.

I recall someone making an asinine comment that what if it was a UPS or FedEx delivery person carrying a hand scanner. Are they really that stupid? When was the last time anyone saw a On the Job UPS, FedEx, USPS, etc delivery driver who first was not wearing a Uniform clearly identifying themselves as an agent who might have a justifiable reason to enter onto someones property? Then, when was the last time that they were not carrying what they were delivering as they were entering,r at least pushing it on a handcart/dolly? And if it is cold out their scanner holster is generally not covered by clothing that could result in their dropping that piece of equipment.

Maybe you can now see just how asinine these comments are. If you cannot, that is your problem, not mine.

 

[sudden valley gunner]

Take the time to look into the note on use and comments, as it cites where the jury instructions are applied and cites supporting them.

No need I am already familiar with laws on use of force, I don't need a wall of text. Jury instruction is not law. Read the law judge the law.

 

[LkWd_Don]

"Case law" is not law either. I wish more people realized that too.

That is very true! But there are so many people out there that are so ignorant of the law, that they would be swayed by large volumes of case-law with results common to what the Prosecutor(s) is/are seeking.

There are also many Lawyers out there that do not know how to do research into Case-Law to find counters to many that could be used against their client to show the Jury that the PA mostly has no case, is grasping at straws to convict, because they cannot show that a law was clearly violated, so they have to rely on such tactics to get around their lack of having any real burden of proof.

 

[sudden valley gunner]

"Case law" is not law either. I wish more people realized that too.

Shhh some people think that oligarch statists in black robes make law and to think differently is "extreme".

 

[LkWd_Don]

Read and absorb if you can, basically one must in imminent fear of life or limb, use reasonable force, not more the necessary and only enough force as a reasonable person know what you knew at the time.
Don in your original post/scenario on this matter was basically, uninvited guest, bulge in clothing, shoot!, the laws in Washington State are not that limited and has specific requirements.

11 WAPRAC WPIC 16.02
WPIC 16.02 Justifiable Homicide—Defense of Self and Others

11 Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 16.02 (3d Ed)


Washington Practice Series TM
Database Updated November 2011

Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
2008 Edition Prepared by the Washington Supreme Court Committee On Jury Instructions, Hon. Sharon S. Armstrong, Co-Chair, Hon. William L. Downing, Co-Chair
​

Part IV. Defenses
WPIC CHAPTER 16. Justifiable Homicide

WPIC 16.02 Justifiable Homicide—Defense of Self and Others

It is a defense to a charge of [murder] [manslaughter] that the homicide was justifiable as defined in this instruction.
Homicide is justifiable when committed in the lawful defense of [the slayer] [the slayer's [husband] [wife] [registered domestic partner] [parent] [child] [brother] [sister]] [any person in the slayer's presence or company] when:
1) the slayer reasonably believed that the person slain [or others whom the defendant reasonably believed were acting in concert with the person slain] intended [to commit a felony] [to inflict death or great personal injury];
2) the slayer reasonably believed that there was imminent danger of such harm being accomplished; and
3) the slayer employed such force and means as a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar conditions as they reasonably appeared to the slayer, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances as they appeared to [him] [her], at the time of [and prior to] the incident.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not justifiable. If you find that the State has not proved the absence of this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

NOTE ON USE

Use this instruction in any homicide case in which this defense is an issue supported by the evidence. Use bracketed material as applicable.
Use WPIC 25.01, Homicide—Definition, with this instruction. Use WPIC 2.04.01, Great Personal Injury—Definition, and WPIC 2.09, Felony—Designation of, as applicable with this instruction. If there is an issue whether the defendant was the aggressor, use WPIC 16.04, Aggressor—Defense of Self and Others.
If resistance to a felony is involved, see WPIC 16.03, Justifiable Homicide—Resistance to Felony.
Do not use this instruction if the deadly force was used to defend against a non-violent felony, such as forgery, bribery, perjury, or the like.
When the offense charged is attempted murder, use this instruction, rather than WPIC 17.02, Lawful Force—Defense of Self, Others, Property.
If a case involves a registered domestic partnership, and if it becomes necessary to define the term for jurors, an instruction can be drafted using language from RCW Chapter 26.60.

COMMENT

Generally. The instruction is based upon RCW 9A.16.050(1).
All facts and circumstances. The instruction's third numbered paragraph, referring to all facts and circumstances, is based upon State v. Allery, 101 Wn.2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984). In Allery, the Supreme Court held that if there is evidence of self-defense, the jury must be instructed “to consider the conditions as they appeared to the slayer, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances known to the slayer at the time and prior to the incident.” State v. Allery, 101 Wn.2d at 595. Also see State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 804 P.2d 577 (1991); State v. Bell, 60 Wn.App. 561, 805 P.2d 815 (Div. 2 1991).
In a case involving allegations of ongoing abuse, the jury is to inquire whether the defendant acted reasonably, given the defendant's experience of abuse by the victim. State v. Janes, 121 Wn.2d 220, 239, 850 P.2d 495, 22 A.L.R.5th 921 (1993).
Burden of proof. The paragraph referring to the burden of proof is based upon State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983). In McCullum, the court held that the State has the burden of proving the absence of self-defense in a prosecution for first degree murder. McCullum continues to be cited with approval on this point. E.g., State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 10, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996). For a detailed discussion see the Introduction to Part IV—Defenses. In State v. Read, 147 Wn.2d 238, 53 P.3d 26 (2002), the court held that a defendant had a burden of producing “some evidence” to establish the killing occurred under circumstances where there was a defense of life and also to produce “some evidence” that he or she had a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm or imminent danger, before the defendant is deemed entitled to raise a self-defense claim. However, this must be read in conjunction with McCullum, where the court explained that there only needs to be some evidence admitted, from whatever source, which tends to prove the killing was done in self-defense. State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d at 487.
Withdrawal. As a general rule, one who is the aggressor or who provokes an altercation in which another is killed cannot invoke the right of self-defense to justify or excuse the homicide. However, the right of self-defense is revived as to the aggressor or the provoker if that person in good faith withdraws from the combat at such time and in such a manner as to clearly apprise the other person that he or she was desisting or intended to desist from further aggressive action. See State v. Craig, 82 Wn.2d 777, 514 P.2d 151 (1973); State v. Wilson, 26 Wn.2d 468, 174 P.2d 553 (1946). In State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 801 P.2d 193 (1990), the Washington Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly refused the defendant's proposed self-defense instruction in a prosecution for felony murder because the defendant did not drop his gun or surrender and did not “clearly manifest a good faith intention to withdraw from the burglary or remove the decedent's fear.” State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d at 618.
Felony murder. A claim of self-defense in felony murder prosecutions presents special problems for instructing the jury. In State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 801 P.2d 193 (1990), the Supreme Court held that because a defendant is strictly responsible for death caused while fleeing from first degree burglary, the trial court properly refused the defendant's proposed self-defense instruction because the burglary was still in progress at the time that the defendant was fleeing from scene. In State v. Bolar, 118 Wn.App. 490, 78 P.2d 1012 (Div. 1 2003), the court, discussing Dennison, seemed to hold that self-defense is not available as a matter of law when the felony murder is based on burglary. In State v. Ferguson, 131 Wn.App. 855, 129 P.3d 856 (Div. 2 2006), the Court of Appeals held that when the felony murder charge is predicated on assault, the defendant may claim self-defense but only if he reasonably feared death or great bodily harm. Thus, the Ferguson court concluded that only WPIC 16.02 can be given in a felony murder prosecution and that WPIC 17.02 can “never” be given. It appears that, in determining whether the jury should be instructed on self-defense, the court should carefully analyze the facts presented at trial and the elements of the predicate felony alleged.
Defense of others. A person has a right to use such force to defend another as the person may use in defending himself or herself. The right to resort to the use of force in defending another is to be judged by the facts and circumstances appearing to the defender at the time. Thus, an individual is justified in using force to defend another if that individual reasonably believes that the person to be protected is the innocent party and in danger, even if, in fact, the person being defended was the aggressor. See State v. Penn, 89 Wn.2d 63, 568 P.2d 797 (1977); State v. Fischer, 23 Wn.App. 756, 598 P.2d 742 (Div. 2 1979); State v. Bernardy, 25 Wn.App. 146, 605 P.2d 791 (Div. 1 1980).
RCW 9A.16.050(1) states in part that homicide is justifiable when committed “in the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company.” It has been held that under this statutory language, a homicide committed in the defense of another is not justifiable, unless the person being defended was present at the time of homicide. See State v. Trevino, 10 Wn.App. 89, 516 P.2d 779 (Div. 3 1973) (homicide allegedly in defense of the defendant's wife and children was not justifiable because neither the wife nor the children were present at the time of the shooting).
Imminent danger. The phrase “the slayer reasonably believed that” is included in the second numbered paragraph in light of the holding of the court in State v. LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d 896, 913 P.2d 369 (1996) (overruled on other grounds in State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 217 P.3d 756 (2009)) and State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 973 P.2d 1049 (1999), that the former version could be misunderstood to require actual imminent danger. See also WPIC 16.07, Justifiable Homicide—Actual Danger Not Necessary, and its Comment.


“Imminence does not require an actual physical assault. A threat, or its equivalent, can support self-defense when there is a reasonable belief that the threat will be carried out. Especially in abusive relationships, patterns of behavior become apparent which can signal the next abusive episode.”

State v. Janes, 121 Wn.2d at 241 (citations omitted). While “immediate harm” means “occurring, acting, or accomplished without loss of time: made or done at once,” “imminent harm” means “ready to take place: near at hand: … hanging threateningly over one's head.” In an abusive situation, “[t]hat the triggering behavior and the abusive episode are divided by time does not necessarily negate the reasonableness of the defendant's perception of imminent harm.” 121 Wn.2d at 241.
Multiple assailants. There is no requirement that the defendant's fear be caused by only the person slain. His self-defense is lawful if based on reasonable fear of imminent harm from either the person slain, or others whom the defendant also reasonably feared. State v. Harris, 122 Wn.App. 547, 90 P.3d 1133 (Div. 2 2004); State v. Irons, 101 Wn.App. 544, 550, 4 P.3d 174 (Div. 1 2000).
Great personal injury. When given in conjunction with this instruction in a case involving the use of force against an unarmed assailant, the definition of “great personal injury” must contain the subjective element, as set forth in WPIC 2.04.01, Great Personal Injury—Definition. State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d 469, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997). Practitioners should carefully note that “great personal injury” is distinct from “great bodily harm.” See the discussion of these terms in the Comment to WPIC 2.04.01. The term “great bodily harm” should not be used with this instruction. State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 475 n.3.
Attempted murder. This instruction, rather than WPIC 17.02, Lawful Force—Defense of Self, Others, Property, should be used when the charged offense is attempted murder. “[T]he important issue is the defendant's mental state in committing the crime, not whether the victim in fact died.” State v. Cowen, 87 Wn.App. 45, 53, 939 P.2d 1249 (Div. 1 1997).
Domestic partners. In 2009, the Legislature amended RCW Chapter 9A.16 to indicate that the chapter's references to spouses are to be interpreted as applying equally to state registered domestic partners. RCW 9A.16.900; Laws of 2009, Chapter 521, § 22 (effective December 3, 2009, based on voter approval of Referendum Measure 71). The pattern instruction has been updated accordingly.
Other. The statute states in part that the defense is applicable “when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony.” For purposes of the defense, the use of deadly force appears to be limited to the resistance of violent felonies that threaten human life or may result in great personal injury. See State v. Nyland, 47 Wn.2d 240, 287 P.2d 345 (1955) (adultery is not a crime that imperils the life of the unoffending spouse or threatens personal injury). No self-defense instruction should be given when deadly force is used to repel an unlawful trespass that does not amount to a felony, because such force is excessive as a matter of law. State v. Griffith, 91 Wn.2d 572, 589 P.2d 799 (1979).
For a discussion of non-violent felonies that would not justify the use of deadly force, see the Comment to WPIC 16.03, Justifiable Homicide—Resistance to Felony.
In State v. Hughes, 106 Wn.2d 176, 721 P.2d 902 (1986), the Washington Supreme Court refused to adopt the doctrine of “imperfect” self-defense. The court found that the trial court did not err in refusing an instruction that stated that “the use of force is not done with unlawful intent to kill where the person believes in good faith that he or she is acting in self-defense even though the person's belief is unreasonable.” State v. Hughes, 106 Wn.2d at 188. Also see State v. Bell, 60 Wn.App. 561, 805 P.2d 815 (Div. 2 1991). For cases relating to a defendant's reasonable belief as a justification for acting in self-defense, see the Comments to WPIC 16.04, Aggressor—Defense of Self and Others and WPIC 17.02, Lawful Force—Defense of Self and Others.
[Current as of February 1, 2010.]

Westlaw. © 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

11 WAPRAC WPIC 16.02

END OF DOCUMENT

11 WAPRAC WPIC 17.02
WPIC 17.02 Lawful Force—Defense of Self, Others, Property
11 Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 17.02 (3d Ed)Washington Practice Series TM
Database Updated November 2011
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 2008 Edition

Prepared by the Washington Supreme Court Committee On Jury Instructions, Hon. Sharon S. Armstrong, Co-Chair, Hon. William L. Downing, Co-Chair

​

Part IV. Defenses
WPIC CHAPTER 17. Lawful Force—Charges Other Than Homicide

WPIC 17.02 Lawful Force—Defense of Self, Others, Property

It is a defense to a charge of __________ that the force [used][attempted][offered to be used] was lawful as defined in this instruction.
[The [use of][attempt to use][offer to use] force upon or toward the person of another is lawful when [used][attempted][offered] [by a person who reasonably believes that [he][she] is about to be injured] [by someone lawfully aiding a person who [he][she] reasonably believes is about to be injured] in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against the person, and when the force is not more than is necessary.]
[The [use of][attempt to use][offer to use] force upon or toward the person of another is lawful when [used][attempted][offered] in preventing or attempting to prevent a malicious trespass or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in that person's possession, and when the force is not more than is necessary.]
The person [using][or][offering to use] the force may employ such force and means as a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar conditions as they appeared to the person, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time of [and prior to] the incident.
The [State][City][County] has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the force [used][attempted][offered to be used] by the defendant was not lawful. If you find that the [State][City][County] has not proved the absence of this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty [as to this charge].

NOTE ON USE

Use this instruction in any case in which this defense is an issue supported by the evidence.
Use bracketed material as applicable. Use this instruction for any charge other than homicide or attempted homicide. If homicide is involved, use WPIC 16.02, Justifiable Homicide—Defense of Self and Others.
With this instruction, use WPIC 16.05, Necessary—Definition. Also use, as applicable, WPIC 2.13, Malice—Maliciously—Definition. If there is an issue whether the defendant was the aggressor, use WPIC 16.04, Aggressor—Defense of Self, or WPIC 16.04.01, Aggressor—Defense of Others.

COMMENT

RCW 9A.16.020(3).
Generally. The wording of this instruction in the second edition “correctly instructed the jury on the subjective standard of self-defense.” State v. Goodrich, 72 Wn.App. 71, 77, 863 P.2d 599 (1993), partially abrogated on other grounds as noted in State v. Ramos, 124 Wn.App. 334, 101 P.3d 872 (2004).
The instruction has been amended for the 2008 edition to clarify for the jury that the defendant need not believe that the defendant or another is about to be injured in order to lawfully use force against a malicious interference with property. See State v. Bland, 128 Wn.App. 511, 116 P.3d 428, 430 (2005).
All facts and circumstances. The third paragraph, referring to all facts and circumstances, is based upon State v. Allery, 101 Wn.2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984). See Comment to WPIC 16.02.
Burden of proof. The paragraph referring to the burden of proof is based upon State v. Acosta, 101 Wn.2d 612, 683 P.2d 1069 (1984). In Acosta, the court held that the State has the burden of proving the absence of self-defense in prosecutions for assault. The court cited both a statutory and a constitutional basis for its holding. The court found that the Legislature intended that the State prove the absence of self-defense when it revised RCW 9A.16.020. The court also found that the burden of proving self-defense may not constitutionally be placed on the defendant if proof of self-defense tends to negate one or more elements of the crime charged. The court noted that placing the burden of proof on the defendant in such cases would relieve the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Failure to instruct the jury that the State has the burden of proving the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt was reversible error when there was sufficient evidence of self-defense to present the issue to the jury. State v. Redwine, 72 Wn.App. 625, 865 P.2d 552 (1994).
For a general discussion of the burden of proof on defenses, see Introduction to Part IV, Defenses.
Relationship to battered woman syndrome. The battered woman syndrome is not a defense in itself. The function of evidence of the battered woman syndrome is to assist the trier of fact in evaluating the defense of self-defense; i.e., in evaluating the reasonableness of both the use of force and the degree of force used by the defendant. Evidence of the battered woman syndrome, alone, is insufficient to submit the defense of self-defense to the jury. In order to submit the defense to the jury, the defendant must show that she perceived imminent danger, based on some threatening behavior or communication by the victim at the time of the incident in question. State v. Walker, 40 Wn.App. 658, 700 P.2d 1168 (1985).
See the discussion of State v. Janes, 121 Wn.2d 220, 239, 850 P.2d 495 (1993), in the Comment to WPIC 16.02, Justifiable Homicide—Defense of Self and Others.
Relationship with “no duty to retreat” rule. The pattern instruction tracks the statutory definition of when force is “not unlawful” as stated in RCW 9A.16.020(3), including its provision that the “force [used by the defendant] is not more than is necessary.”
The “necessary” force limitation included in both RCW 9A.16.020(3) and this instruction may seem in conflict with Washington's rule that there is no duty to retreat in certain cases. See discussion in State v. Williams, 81 Wn.App. 738, 916 P.2d 445 (1996). The statutory definition of “necessary” includes that “no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist.” RCW 9A.16.010(1). In a given case, a jury could interpret this language as precluding consideration of self-defense for a defendant who was resisting an attack in a place where he had a right to be, because he did not take an avenue of retreat. In such a case, the court may need to make clearer to the jury that the defendant was not obliged to retreat rather than defend. See State v. Williams, 81 Wn.App. at 744 (holding that “where a jury may conclude that flight is a reasonably effective alternative to the use of force in self-defense, the no duty to retreat instruction should be given.”). At the same time, the prosecutor should not be deprived of the argument that other alternatives to the use of force may have existed. In such a case, the court should use the “no duty to retreat” instruction of WPIC 17.05, using the second bracketed alternative, which explains in more detail the relationship of the “necessary force” limitation and the “no duty to retreat” rule.
Defense of property. Because the defendant was not in lawful possession of wildlife (coyotes), he could not invoke defense of property as a defense to assault. State v. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d 460, 470–71, 901 P.2d 286, 50 A.L.R.5th 921 (1995). A defendant may use necessary force against a malicious trespass or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in that person's possession even though the defendant does not reasonably believe that he is about to be injured. See State v. Bland, 128 Wn.App. 511, 116 P.3d 428, 430 (2005).
Accidental injury. When there is evidence that the defendant had a reasonable fear of the victim, intentionally pointed a gun at a victim, used a reasonable amount of force, and was not the aggressor, it is error to refuse to give a self-defense instruction. In such circumstances, a claim of self-defense is not inconsistent with a claim that the gun was fired accidentally. State v. Callahan, 87 Wn.App. 925, 943 P.2d 676 (1997).
Attempted homicide. When the charged offense is attempted murder, the appropriate instruction is WPIC 16.02, Justifiable Homicide—Defense of Self and Others, rather than WPIC 17.02. State v. Cowen, 87 Wn.App. 45, 53, 939 P.2d 1249 (1997).
Felony murder. A claim of self-defense in felony murder prosecutions presents special problems for instructing the jury. In State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 801 P.2d 193 (1990), the Supreme Court held that because a defendant is strictly responsible for death caused while fleeing from first degree burglary, the trial court properly refused the defendant's proposed self-defense instruction because the burglary was still in progress at time that the defendant was fleeing from scene. In State v. Bolar, 118 Wn.App. 490, 78 P.3d 1012 (2003), the court, discussing Dennison, seemed to hold that self-defense is not available as a matter of law when the felony murder is based on burglary. In State v. Ferguson, 131 Wn.App. 855, 129 P.3d 856 (2006), the Court of Appeals held that when the felony murder charge is predicated on assault, the defendant may claim self-defense but only if he reasonably feared death or great bodily harm. Thus, the Ferguson court concluded that only WPIC 16.02 can be given in a felony murder prosecution and that WPIC 17.02 can “never” be given. It appears that, in determining whether the jury should be instructed on self-defense, the court should carefully analyze the facts presented at trial and the elements of the predicate felony alleged.
Other statutes. RCW 9A.16.020(4) defines lawful force by a parent, guardian, or teacher. RCW 9A.16.100 defines lawful force by a passenger carrier in expelling a passenger. RCW 9A.16.020(6) defines lawful force in dealing with a mentally retarded or mentally ill person.
[Current as of July 2008.]

Westlaw. © 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

11 WAPRAC WPIC 17.02

Putting aside the fact that a few of your links did not work for me. Causing me to go looking for cited cases, I found some that did not even relate to my original comment, such as "STATE v. ACOSTA" Which is a case where a guy picks up a gal from a bar, goes for a drive, smokes some pot, accuses her of stealing his wallet, gets into a physical confrontation, she accused him of attempted rape.

Yes the court ruling makes mention of Use of Force, however, as the example of this case does not fit, it is of little logical relationship to the example I gave so is simply worthless diatribe. As were a few other of your supposed speaking points being made.
http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=1984713101Wn2d612_1657.xml&docbase=CSLWAR1-1950-1985

However, your citing State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d 469 (1997) is confusing if you are trying to show that I could not just as easily use “fear of serious injury” as I could use fear of death, for a legitimate defense, if I were charged with any crime for protecting myself or my property.

Here is a site that sums it up a bit better for those who would take the time to not only read but understand what they are reading. http://acawiki.wikispot.org/self-defense
Emphasis has been added.

SELF-DEFENSE

Generally

The general rule in Washington allows the use of reasonable force in self defense by a person who reasonably believes he is about to be injured. The notable exception involves arresting law enforcement officers. There, force may be used only where the individual actually faces imminent danger of serious injury or death. State v. Bradley, 141 Wn.2d 731, 737 (2000)(when using force to defend against actions of a correctional officer defendant must show he or she was in actual, imminent danger of serious injury or death). The so-called “arrest rule” applies to juvenile facilities. The juvenile may only use force when facing actual imminent danger of serious injury or death. State v. Garcia, 107 Wn. App. 545 (2001).
Note: For a good general discussion on law of self-defense see State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d 469 (1997).

Self-defense negates the “knowledge” and “unlawful” elements of assault. State v. Acosta, 101 Wn.2d 612, 618, 683 P.2d 1069 (1984); State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983). When a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 89 Wn. App. 364, 367 (1997); State v. LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d 896, 903, 913 P.2d 369 (1996); State v. Box, 109 Wn.2d 320, 745 P.2d 23 (1987)(applying rule to murder case).

Self-defense evidence is evaluated “from the standpoint of the reasonably prudent person, knowing all the defendant knows and seeing all the defendant sees.” When assessing a self defense claim, the trial court applies both a subjective and objective test. The subjective portion requires the jury to stand in the shoes of the defendant and consider all of the facts and circumstances known to him or her; the objective portion requires the jury to use this information to determine what a reasonably prudent person similarly situated would have done. State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 767, 772 (1998); State v. Read, 147 Wn.2d 238 (2002)(court in bench trial refused to apply self-defense because defendant failed to satisfy the subjective element of self-defense); State v. Miller, 89 Wn. App. 364, 368 (1997)(citations omitted); State v. Irons 101 Wn. App. 544 (2000).

A finding of actual imminent danger is not necessary to establish self defense. A jury may find self defense on the basis of the defendant’s subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim. State v. LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d 896, 899, 913 P.2d 369(1996)(rejecting accuracy of WPIC 16.02 finding it presumptively prejudicial); State v. Corn, 95 Wn. App. 41, 52 (1999)(instruction error in manslaughter prosecution). An instruction which allows the average juror to conclude that a finding of actual danger is a necessary element of self-defense is erroneous and presumed prejudicial. State v. Fields, 87 Wn. App. 57 (1997); State v. Birnel, 89 Wn. App. 459 (1998)(reversing conviction based on erroneous self-defense instructions).
Note: Arresting law enforcement officers are the exception to this rule. A person may use force to resist law enforcement only if the arrestee actually faces imminent danger of serious injury or death. State v. Bradley, 141 Wn.2d 731 (2000).

Self-defense is available as a defense against a charge of third degree assault. State v. Dyson, 90 Wn. App. 433 (1997).
Self-defense is available to a juvenile charged with assaulting a parent. A claim of reasonable force for disciplinary purposes under RCW 9A.16.100 by the parent is a completely separate inquiry from whether the child initially entitled to raise the claim of self-defense. State v. Graves, 97 Wn. App. 55 (1999).

I do believe I made this comment in another post. No one here knows the training I have received. According to the laws, the Jury must put themselves in my shoes, as if they know what I know, see it as I saw it, feel what I felt, and then decide if they would have reacted differently. Until in court, I will not disclose the extent of my training. I have already made mention that I am relatively frail, and therefore, most any aggressive act against me might be fatal. So to avoid injury or death, I may have to react before my potential assailant gets within 40 feet of me. And again, the law supports me as I am not a LEO! I am not saddled with the full restrictions of law that bear greatly upon them.

 

[BigDave]

I do believe I made this comment in another post. No one here knows the training I have received. According to the laws, the Jury must put themselves in my shoes, as if they know what I know, see it as I saw it, feel what I felt, and then decide if they would have reacted differently. Until in court, I will not disclose the extent of my training. I have already made mention that I am relatively frail, and therefore, most any aggressive act against me might be fatal. So to avoid injury or death, I may have to react before my potential assailant gets within 40 feet of me. And again, the law supports me as I am not a LEO! I am not saddled with the full restrictions of law that bear greatly upon them.

And yet you do not know what others in the forum training level is nor mine.
In your original scenario there was no threat yet you attempt to blah blah blah that you could make it work, a ridiculous claim.
The Jury is asked to view the evidence as a prudent responsible person knowing what you knew at the time and would have acted as you did, a lot different then must put themselves in your shoes.
Being frail has a place with disparity of force but there is none unless their is an actual perceived threat, coming onto a property armed or not and your only admission that a bulge, no verbal threats, no actions of threats nada zip zero, you literally have no leg to stand on. Do not think being frail, disabled gives one a pass, it doesn't and does not lessen the requirement for an imminent threat.
Before any potential threat gets within 4o feet? There must be an imminent threat of life or limb not just out of bare fear, there must be a real fear.

 

[LkWd_Don]

And yet you do not know what others in the forum training level is nor mine.
In your original scenario there was no threat yet you attempt to blah blah blah that you could make it work, a ridiculous claim.
The Jury is asked to view the evidence as a prudent responsible person knowing what you knew at the time and would have acted as you did, a lot different then must put themselves in your shoes.
Being frail has a place with disparity of force but there is none unless their is an actual perceived threat, coming onto a property armed or not and your only admission that a bulge, no verbal threats, no actions of threats nada zip zero, you literally have no leg to stand on. Do not think being frail, disabled gives one a pass, it doesn't and does not lessen the requirement for an imminent threat.
Before any potential threat gets within 4o feet? There must be an imminent threat of life or limb not just out of bare fear, there must be a real fear.

You are right, I have no knowledge of what your training is or what others are. What does that have to do with My Rights or My Ability to Defend My Self or Property?

In my scenario, I did leave details out. I think I made it clear before that I would not list all the details that I feel may be relevant.

You still have not shown that:
1) I have an obligation to disclose all. Is there such a Law? Till you can produce such proof, I will only disclose what I wish to disclose and even if I were being charged with a crime that I did not commit, I have a right to not discuss that as well, even with authorities. Or would you attempt to tell me and others, otherwise?

2) I do not have a right to protect myself or my property!


No, if I were arrested for any act that I am before a Jury, and I am claiming self-defense, then even a finding of actual imminent danger is not necessary to establish self defense. Or did you miss that in my last post. Making a big majority of your -and many others- argument here impotent. It is also clear in that last post that requiring the average juror to conclude that a finding of actual danger is a necessary element of self-defense is erroneous and presumed prejudicial. This again pokes a big hole in arguments against me here.

Maybe you should not ignore this, "The general rule in Washington allows the use of reasonable force in self defense by a person who reasonably believes he is about to be injured." before you continue insisting others have no right to decide for themselves what they may or may not view as being a threat to themselves.

In the Onalaska case that was mentioned as being a parallel to my scenario, it is not, as I made no mention of laying in wait for the supposed BG to show up for me to shoot him/her.

Yet you ignore that fact as well.

He was charged with first-degree murder because of his premeditation in the case, but then was sentenced to 5 years for Manslaughter, and here is a quote about why:

“He caused this by going offensively outside the garage.”

Quote from http://www.lewiscountysirens.com/?p=7299

Additional link.
http://www.theolympian.com/2010/11/25/1452209/onalaska-homeowner-who-shot-intruder.html

 

[Grim_Night]

This thread is seriously off topic and continues to bead a dead horse

As I stated in my post title, this thread has become seriously off topic. Even if it was on topic, it wouldn't matter much as it continues to cover a topic of discussion that has been gone over many times before with the same results. If a private property owner does not want you on their property while carrying a legally owned and carried weapon then that is their choice. If that private property owner is a business then take your money elsewhere. I you must go to such private property, then conceal your weapon and go about your day but risk being ejected from the property if the knowledge of your weapon becomes known to the property owner or management. END OF STORY

 

[Freedom1Man]

Still off topic!!!

Hey Grim_Night, long time no post, how have you been?