marshaul...
"Since a mother obviously has a pre-existing right to life and bodily self-determination, it necessarily follows that a fetus develops no right to life until one (or both) of the following conditions are met:
1. Its living is no longer dependent upon (thus in definitionally impermissible overlap with) its mother's pre-existing right of bodily self-determination. That is to say, it is viable under the current state of medical technology).
or
2. Its mother decides to keep it, thereby obviating that potential (but impermissible) overlap of rights."
I do not think that "necessarily" follows. I really do not understand where you're drawing your line there as to when the fetus "develops" its right to life (current medical definition of "viable," really?), why you decide to draw the line there, or how you believe it "necessarily" follows your premise.
The line ends up there as a purely practical matter. If a mother has a right to bodily self-determination, and if rights do not overlap, then the fetus can have no right to life until such is no longer dependent upon its mother's bodily self-determination. Otherwise, there would be overlap.
Obviously, this lack of dependency becomes true at birth, if never else. But it might be true at other times. If medical technology is able to keep a fetus alive, and someone wishes to pay for that medical care, then the fetus's life is no longer dependent upon his mother, and her bodily self-determination is no longer relevant to determining the status of the fetus's right to life.
I don't understand what you mean by the fetus' life being dependent on the mother's right to bodily self-determination. Could you please elaborate on this? Do you mean that the fetus' life is dependent on the mother declining to exercise her right to bodily self-determination in any manner which would effect the baby's "viability"?
It's a simple syllogism. If rights cannot overlap, and if a mother has a right to bodily self-determination, then a fetus cannot have a right to life which would overlap with its mother's right of bodily self-determination. It follows, then, that such right develops at the time when this potential overlap no longer exists.
I don't understand what you mean by the mother's decision to keep the baby obviating that potential (but impermissible) overlap of rights. Your premises states that there is no potential overlap of rights, since rights cannot overlap, and therefore it would not be impermissible, but it would be impossible.
Impossible, "definitionally impermissible": the difference is slight. I initially considered using "impossible", but I decided the construction I used was semantically more precise.
Moreover, I don't think that deciding to keep the baby necessarily resolves the underlying issue. If the mother "decides to keep it", do you think that she in essence, at that moment, forfeits her right and by that act the baby's right to life is suddenly possible (since there's no longer a pre-existing and conflicting right of the mother), and is also automatically endowed at that moment in time? Would the mother then, from that point in time forward, be unable to change her mind, since now the baby's right to life has been established?
I've thought through all this before, but I concluded it doesn't really matter from the perspective of law. If the sole factor deciding whether a fetus has a right to life is the mother's will, then we essentially have to take her word for it. If the mother decides to have an abortion, and the fetus is dependent upon her body for survival, then it follows the fetus can have had no right to life up to the point that decision was made.
On the other hand, if a person kills a fetus, and the mother asserts she intended to keep it (and, in fact, had no abortion), then how are we to disprove such a claim?
Basically, we should assume a right to life on the part of a fetus, unless the mother gives us reason to question that assumption.
From a strictly and omnisciently moral perspective, we could say that the mother hasn't really "decided" to a finality until such a time as the fetus reaches viability, or the fetus is killed (at which point, we can assume she had decided in its favor, unless she asserts otherwise).
Honestly, I would propose that "maternity" could in fact be one of the few, if not the only legitimate instances of so-called "positive" rights - a right of the child, which rightfully compels the parent, and establishes certain obligations on them.
That's an attractive notion. But I'm afraid it isn't universal or consistently applicable enough. What about children whose parents are dead? What of
their positive right? What of children whose parents are insane, or incarcerated, or comatose, or...? What if the mother was a victim of rape? What about every child put up for adoption? Upon whose obligations-by-right may they depend?
"To this I would merely respond that, when there is such widespread disagreement in society, such a belief cannot assume the mantle of moral tenet and is unworthy of enshrinement in law. And, until such agreement is found, it is a prior act of aggression to impose one minority view upon another."
Uhh, no, I don't think so... Whether or not interference to the act of abortion is justified is hardly determined by majority agreement. You might as well have just said "democracy" here. Nor would interference, if it is ever justified, be only justified after the discovery of the justification by at least a certain percentage of persons, as you seem to be suggesting here. So, 1. the morality of the issue is not determined by majority agreement and 2. acting morally in regards to abortion or opposition thereto is not subject to majority discovery of the moral tenet.
I suspect you think I'm bound to agree with you here, due to my espoused preference for anarchism. But I do not.
I indeed oppose the legislative enactment, through majority rule (or otherwise), of impositions upon right. I do not, however, oppose the existence of justice by jury and the common law.
Although you may believe the common law to be a gift from god, I recognize it as nothing more than the standards established by universally-shared moral tenets. Murder is abhorrent under the common law because we all agree that it is, not because God, a king, or a democratic government declared it so.
I am not aware of a society which does not in some fashion subject its members to judgment of the whole. I do not oppose this universality, but rather the precise procedure by which it occurs under the modern state.
