Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) is instructive to the Court's determination that the police officers' request for proof of Mr. Combs' age was a lawful command, and to the Court's finding that there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Combs for resisting a police officer. In Hiibel, the Supreme Court held that during lawful Terry stops, police officers may compel suspects to provide their names and, pursuant to state law, may arrest suspects who refuse to do so. Id. at 185–88. The Supreme Court reasoned that obtaining a person's identification during a Terry stop is a “commonsense inquiry” that “serves important government interests”: it may “inform an officer that a suspect is wanted” or may “help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere.” Id. at 186, 89. The police must have a reasonable basis for stopping the suspect and “an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the request for identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop.” Id. at 188.
*9 Hiibel involved a person lawfully stopped under Terry who refused to give his name, in a state which legally required it. However, the law did not require the citizen to provide identification. See id. at 185. While there are important distinctions between Hiibel and this case—specifically, name versus age, and stop and identify law versus must comply with a lawful command law—the Terry principle reaffirmed in Hiibel and applicable here is this: demanding and obtaining certain identifying information from a suspect may be a critical and legitimate component to a Terry stop. In this instance, the discrete command to Mr. Combs to prove his age was reasonably related to the investigation of a potential underage person carrying a gun in public, in violation of § 750.234f.
The Court also finds Klaucke v. Daly helpful. In a case from Massachusetts-a state without a stop and identify law—the First Circuit held that during a lawful Terry stop, a police officer's demand to see the drivers' license of a person suspected of being underage and carrying alcohol was reasonable, and that the police officer was not required to accept the person's word that he was 21, without proof. 595 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.2010) (The police officer's “demand for identification, plainly, was reasonably related to his suspicion that [the plaintiff] was underage. Under the circumstances of this case [where the plaintiff repeatedly refused to show identification], the officer was not required to take [the plaintiff] at his word that he was 21.”).
Accordingly, even in the absence of a stop and identify law in Michigan, the police officers' request that Mr. Combs provide identification that would prove his age was a lawful command, based on this Court's finding that: (1) Hiibel stands for the proposition that identifying information can be required of suspects during a Terry stop; and (2) a police officer can require proof to dispel reasonable suspicions of underage violations of the law during a Terry stop. The police officers' requests were reasonably related to the circumstances justifying Mr. Combs' legal Terry stop; they investigated a suspected violation of the underage weapon statute, based on a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Combs was not 18.
Viewed at the time of the incident, a reasonable police officer on the scene would believe that Mr. Combs' refusal to provide proof of his age constituted resisting or a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command. Probable cause to arrest a person for violation of either the Birmingham Ordinance or § 750.479 does not require an actual physical interference or the threat of it. Therefore, Mr. Combs' refusal to provide proof of his age supplied probable cause to arrest him for resisting/obstructing. See Devoe v. Rebant, 05–71863, 2006 WL 334297, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Feb.13, 2006) (After the officers lawfully stopped [the plaintiff], his refusal to provide identification and cooperate provided probable cause to arrest him for hindering and obstructing in violation of [§ 750.479] and/or Eastpointe Ordinance 658.03.”). Mr. Combs' false arrest/imprisonment claims based on resisting a police officer fail.