snipp...
Like the Florida school shooter ... You have all the information on him.
When would have you intervened and took away is rights.
snippp..
Yes FI let's examine your example...
1.
Cruz (Much of the information surrounding Cruz’s mental health and educational treatment is confidential under Florida and federal law)
a. [...it was determined that
Cruz received extensive mental health treatment and school-based treatment from multiple providers. Over a nine-year period, Cruz regularly received hundreds of hours of therapy sessions from Henderson Behavioral Health. Moreover, Cruz also received additional educational services and behavioral care from multiple other providers for many years. To the knowledge of the
Commission, Cruz did not receive any treatment in the months immediately preceding the February 14, 2018, shooting.]
b. [Cruz had several different public and private mental health providers. There was some care coordination, but
no master case management. No single health professional or entity had the entire “story” regarding Cruz’s mental health and family issues, due, in part, to an absence of communication between providers and a lack of disclosure by the Cruz family.
Cruz received extensive mental and behavioral health services until he turned 18 and
decided himself to stop treatment.
Because of his decision to stop treatment, Cruz was not under the care of any mental health provider at the time of the shooting. Cruz’s last contact with HBH was more than one year before the shooting.]
2.
Law enforcement
a. [Prior to February 14, 2018, BSO had a total of 43 contacts with the Cruz family. Of the 43 contacts, 21 involved Nikolas Cruz alone or both Nikolas and Zachary Cruz. Twenty-two of the incidents involved only Zachary Cruz. Of the 21 incidents involving Nikolas Cruz, most were minor and warranted no further law enforcement action.
Two of the incidents warranted additional follow-up that was not conducted. Both deputies were found to have violated BSO policy and were disciplined. (after Parkland)
b. [The first tip was received on the FBI Public Access Line (PAL) on September 25, 2017, from Ben Bennight in Mississippi. Bennight, who was unknown to Cruz, reported a video on YouTube stating, “I’m going to be the next school shooter,” made by a user identified as
“nikolas cruz.” The information was forwarded to the Mississippi FBI office for follow up and the tipster was interviewed.
However, it was determined there was not enough information available to positively identify the poster of the video and the tip was closed on October 11, 2017. Efforts to serve legal process on YouTube or Google that could have potentially identified the poster were not made.]
c. [The second call to the FBI PAL was placed on January 5, 2018, by a friend of the Cruz family, Mary Hamel. Hamel had become increasingly concerned about postings Cruz was making on Instagram and feared he would actually follow through on threats to harm
others by perpetrating a school shooting. During the thirteen-minute phone call, Hamel provided details of Cruz’s gun purchases, animal mutilations, escalating temper and Cruz’s Instagram usernames. The name, address and phone number for the Snead family was also provided, which was the residence where Cruz was residing at the time due to the death of his mother. After some initial searches by the call-taker,
the tip was closed out after it was labeled as having no lead value. It is not clear at this time exactly why the lead was labeled as having no value and closed
without being forwarded to a local FBI office for further evaluation.]
(The FBI declined to make a formal presentation of explanation)
d. BSO
1. BSO deputies had some level of knowledge and familiarity with their active shooter policy. Several of them referenced that their policy states that they “may” enter a building or structure to engage an active shooter.
2.
Sheriff Israel inserted the word “may” in the BSO policy, and it is insufficient and fails to unequivocally convey the expectation that deputies are expected to immediately enter an active assailant scene where gunfire is active and to neutralize the threat. The use of the word “may” in BSO policy is inconsistent with current and standard law enforcement practices.
3. Some deputies
could not remember the last time they attended active shooter training.
4. Some deputies
could not recall what type of active assailant training they received.
e. CSPD
1. CSPD officers
had a high level of knowledge and familiarity with their active shooter policy. Many reference that the policy states they “shall” engage the threat.
2.
All CSPD officers remembered their active shooter training because they
attended the training on an annual basis. Many of the officers praised the quality of their training and the equipment that they are provided.
3.
School system:
a. [...the District failed was when it provided Cruz erroneous information concerning his options for services at MSDHS. The onus was on the District to seek a court determination if it wanted to force Cruz to attend an alternate school. Due to this misinformation, Cruz remained at MSDHS until February 2017 when he transferred to an adult learning center. Cruz subsequently sought to return to high school and to reengage ESE services, but
the District failed to implement the necessary processes that would have returned Cruz to high school. Cruz remained in the adult learning center environment without ESE services until the shooting.]
b.
[Several staff who had an opportunity to call a Code Red (after seeing Cruz w/firearm walking outside on school grounds) failed to do so, and there is no evidence to support the claims of other staff members that they called a Code Red]
c. [Poor communication — not a technical problem — left police trying to track the Parkland school shooter on video surveillance when he had already left the building, “communication failure”
led police to believe they were tracking the shooter in real time, when in fact they were seeing footage from 20 minutes earlier, the Coral Springs police chief said.
Police searching for Nikolas Cruz desperately needed to know where he was at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High, as students cowered behind locked doors. But their colleagues looking at security monitors in another building
fed them wrong information because they didn’t realize — or didn’t convey — that they were watching a recording rather than a live feed, Chief Tony Pustizzi said.]
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/...oting-coral-springs-video-20180222-story.html
ya...sheriff fired by FL Gov; RSO who retired, fired, lost pensiion and jailed; two other deputies fired...oh school administrators...nada done to them!
You are absolutely right...threats should be responded to but with the right citizen safe guards [due process if you will] in place ...but in this unbelievable tragic comedy of errors by FBI, FL's MH system, Sheriff's office, or the Parkland School they weren't nor were they in the Aurora theater incident where the college psychologist failed to report, nor in the TX church shooting by the USAF.
All these incidents are a tragic comedy of errors where someone after the fact states ~ OPPS!
unless otherwise noted cite for majority of references stated:
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/CommissionReport.pdf
fox4kc.com
