Gray Peterson
Founder's Club Member - Moderator
Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgement has been denied.
Highlights:
I am not entirely persuaded by LaCabe’s contention that he is not a proper defendant in this action. I note that a basic element of standing for Article III purposes is an injury “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 2007). Here, it is undisputed that LaCabe is the responsible official in enforcing the statutory scheme in Denver. Moreover, LaCabe’s action in denying Plaintiff’s application is the cause of Plaintiff’s alleged injury (inability to obtain a concealed handgun permit) and a favorable decision will redress the injury. Therefore, for the purposes of Article III standing, it appears that LaCabe is an appropriate defendant.
Moreover, that LaCabe could not exercise discretion does not necessarily bar an action against him. See, e.g., Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1980) (examining whether, under Ex Parte Young, local officials enforcing statutory scheme were proper defendants and concluding that the fact that their duties were entirely ministerial was not a defense to liability; “Under Ex Parte Young the inquiry is not the nature of an official’s duties but into the effect of the official’s perform nce of his duties on the plaintiff’s rights”). The court in Finberg similarly rejected any notion that the defendants did not have a sufficient interest in the constitutionality of the rules to be adverse to the plaintiff, similar to what LaCabe argues here. Id. (“Once the [local officials] have relied on the authority conferred by the [state] procedures to work an injury to the plaintiff, they may not disclaim interest in the constitutionality of these procedures.”). Accordingly, I disagree that the motion for summary judgment should be denied on this basis.
LaCabe has provided no legal authority to show why he cannot address the constitutional arguments presented by Plaintiff regarding the statute. Nonetheless, given that the Attorney General is now a party and will presumably respond to these issues, I will also reserve ruling on Defendant LaCabe’s liability.
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Accordingly, it is ordered:
1. The Motion to Dismiss Executive Director Peter Weir and Colorado Attorney General’s Request to Be Heard (ECF No. 6) is granted.
2. All claims against Defendant Peter Weir shall be dismissed.
3. John W. Suthers, Attorney General for the State of Colorado, is a party to this action as an intervenor.
4. The Attorney General may file a response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant LaCabe (ECF No. 17) within 30 days of the date of this order and Plaintiff may file a reply brief in accordance with D.C.COLO.LCivR 56.1.A..
5. Defendant LaCabe’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff (ECF No. 19) is denied.
Highlights:
I am not entirely persuaded by LaCabe’s contention that he is not a proper defendant in this action. I note that a basic element of standing for Article III purposes is an injury “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 2007). Here, it is undisputed that LaCabe is the responsible official in enforcing the statutory scheme in Denver. Moreover, LaCabe’s action in denying Plaintiff’s application is the cause of Plaintiff’s alleged injury (inability to obtain a concealed handgun permit) and a favorable decision will redress the injury. Therefore, for the purposes of Article III standing, it appears that LaCabe is an appropriate defendant.
Moreover, that LaCabe could not exercise discretion does not necessarily bar an action against him. See, e.g., Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1980) (examining whether, under Ex Parte Young, local officials enforcing statutory scheme were proper defendants and concluding that the fact that their duties were entirely ministerial was not a defense to liability; “Under Ex Parte Young the inquiry is not the nature of an official’s duties but into the effect of the official’s perform nce of his duties on the plaintiff’s rights”). The court in Finberg similarly rejected any notion that the defendants did not have a sufficient interest in the constitutionality of the rules to be adverse to the plaintiff, similar to what LaCabe argues here. Id. (“Once the [local officials] have relied on the authority conferred by the [state] procedures to work an injury to the plaintiff, they may not disclaim interest in the constitutionality of these procedures.”). Accordingly, I disagree that the motion for summary judgment should be denied on this basis.
LaCabe has provided no legal authority to show why he cannot address the constitutional arguments presented by Plaintiff regarding the statute. Nonetheless, given that the Attorney General is now a party and will presumably respond to these issues, I will also reserve ruling on Defendant LaCabe’s liability.
.......
Accordingly, it is ordered:
1. The Motion to Dismiss Executive Director Peter Weir and Colorado Attorney General’s Request to Be Heard (ECF No. 6) is granted.
2. All claims against Defendant Peter Weir shall be dismissed.
3. John W. Suthers, Attorney General for the State of Colorado, is a party to this action as an intervenor.
4. The Attorney General may file a response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant LaCabe (ECF No. 17) within 30 days of the date of this order and Plaintiff may file a reply brief in accordance with D.C.COLO.LCivR 56.1.A..
5. Defendant LaCabe’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff (ECF No. 19) is denied.
